Northwestern, O\u27Bannon and The Future: Cultivating a New Era for Taxing Qualified Scholarships by Kisska-Schulze, Kathryn & Epstein, Adam
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
August 2016
Northwestern, O'Bannon and The Future:
Cultivating a New Era for Taxing Qualified
Scholarships
Kathryn Kisska-Schulze
Adam Epstein
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kisska-Schulze, Kathryn and Epstein, Adam (2015) "Northwestern, O'Bannon and The Future: Cultivating a New
Era for Taxing Qualified Scholarships," Akron Law Review: Vol. 49 : Iss. 4 , Article 1.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss4/1
1 - KISSKA-SCHULTZE MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016 12:34 PM 
 
771 
NORTHWESTERN, O’BANNON AND THE FUTURE: 
CULTIVATING A NEW ERA FOR TAXING QUALIFIED 
SCHOLARSHIPS 
Kathryn Kisska-Schulze* 
Adam Epstein** 
I.  Introduction ............................................................... 772 
II.  The NLRB v. Northwestern—The Pay-for-Play Model 
Gains Traction ........................................................... 775 
III.  History in the Making—Taxing Athletic Scholarships 
in the Wake of the NLRB’s 2014 Northwestern 
Decision ..................................................................... 782 
A. Taxing Qualified Scholarships—Understanding IRC 
Section 117.......................................................... 783 
B. Compensation for Services Rendered—Treasury 
Regulation § 1.117-4(c) and Judicial 
Interpretation. ...................................................... 785 
IV.  The Student-Athlete as Employee—The Federal 
Income Tax Perspective ............................................. 793 
A. Examining the Employer-Employee Relationship 795 
1. The Common Law/IRS Twenty-Factor Test .. 795 
2. The Economic Realities Test .......................... 801 
3. The Hybrid Test .............................................. 803 
B. Characterizing Student-Athletes as Employees for 
Federal Income Tax Purposes ............................. 805 
V.  Conclusion ................................................................. 810 
 
 
* JD, LL.M., Assistant Professor, College of Business, School of Accountancy, Clemson University. 
** J.D./M.B.A., Professor, Department of Finance and Law, Central Michigan University. 
1
Kisska-Schulze and Epstein: Taxing Qualified Scholarships
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
1 - KISSKA-SCHULTZE MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  12:34 PM 
772 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:771 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 26, 2014, the Chicago district (Region 13) of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that Northwestern University’s 
scholarship football players were employees of the institution under the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and could unionize and bargain 
collectively.1 Traditionally, college sports have operated under the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) fundamental 
principle of “amateurism,”2 only allowing student-athletes to receive 
grants-in-aid (i.e., athletic scholarships) to help pay for their college 
educations while concurrently engaging in competitive athletics for their 
universities.3 This principle of “amateurism” ensures that generally, 
student-athletes who are, or have been, paid to play are essentially 
permanently ineligible to compete in varsity athletic competition in that 
particular sport.4 
The Chicago district’s milestone 2014 ruling threatened the 
fundamental paradigm of amateurism in collegiate sports by permitting 
 
 1.  See also Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, “Show Me the Money!”—Analyzing 
the Potential State Tax Implications of Paying Student-Athletes, 14 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 13-
14 (2014); Brian Bennett, Northwestern Players Get Union Vote, ESPN COLLEGE FOOTBALL (Mar. 
27, 2014, 9:23 AM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10677763/northwestern-wildcats-
football-players-win-bid-unionize; Ben Strauss & Steve Elder, College Players Granted Right to 
Form Union, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/
sports/ncaafootball/national-labor-relations-board-rules-northwestern-players-are-employees-and-
can-unionize.html. 
 2.  See 2015-2016 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, available at 
https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4388-2015-2016-ncaa-division-i-manual-august-version-
available-august-2015.aspx. [hereinafater “NCAA Manual”]. NCAA rules are also known formally 
as Bylaws; see, e.g., NCAA Manual 2.9, The Principle of Amateurism (“Student-athletes shall be 
amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by 
education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in 
intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by 
professional and commercial enterprises.”); see generally Adam Epstein & Paul Anderson, Utilization 
of the NCAA Manual as a Teaching Tool, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 109, 118, 124 (2009); T. Matthew 
Lockhart, Comment: Oliver v. NCAA: Throwing a Contractual Curveball at the NCAA’s “Veil of 
Amateurism,” 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 175, 186 (2010) (noting the deference that courts have given 
to the manner in which the NCAA defines and regulates amateurism according to its rules, more 
formally known as bylaws). 
 3.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1, at 14, 21; see also Strauss & Elder, supra note 
1. We recognize that the vast majority of colleges and universities are members of the NCAA but that 
the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) also exists for others as well. See 
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics, Member Schools, http://www.naia.org/
ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=27900&ATCLID=205322922 (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 4.  Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, William H. Lyons & Kevin N. Rask, What’s in a Name? The 
Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate Model, and the Treatment of Student-Athletes, 92 OR. L. REV. 879, 
882 (2014). 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss4/1
1 - KISSKA-SCHULTZE MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  12:34 PM 
2016] TAXING QUALIFIED SCHOLARSHIPS 773 
scholarship football players to unionize.5 Specifically, the decision 
concluded that Northwestern football players receive the substantial 
economic benefit of scholarship money in exchange for performing 
football-related services under what amounts to a contract for hire and 
noted that the university’s football coaching staff exert a significant 
amount of control over the players to such a degree that scholarships may 
be revoked if players break team rules.6 
Following this landmark decision, Northwestern University filed an 
appeal with the NLRB in an effort to invalidate the regional decision.7 On 
August 17, 2015, the NLRB rejected the bid by football players at 
Northwestern University to form a union in a unanimous seven-page 
decision in which the board declined to assert jurisdiction in the case 
because allowing athletes at a private university to organize would not 
“promote stability in labor relations.”8 Still, this case—which currently 
maintains the status quo of student-athletes as amateurs—helped reignite 
the sixty-year, heavily deliberated concern over whether student-athletes 
should be paid to play.9 While the NLRB overturned the Chicago district’s 
 
 5.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1. 
 6.  WithumSmith+Brown, CPAs, A Win for Student Athletes or for the IRS?, DOUBLE 
TAXATION: A TAX ON ALL THINGS TAXES (Apr. 8, 2014), http://double-taxation.com/2014/04/08/a-
win-for-student-athletes-or-for-the-irs/; see also Strauss and Elder, supra note 1 (addressing that the 
NLRB’s ruling was based on various factors, to include the amount of time devoted to the sport of 
football, the extent of control exercised by coaches, and the scholarship agreements entered into 
between universities and student-athletes). 
 7.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1, at 13-14; see also Amanda Becker, 
Northwestern University Appeals Decision Granting Football Team Union Vote, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 
2014, 4:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/09/us-college-football-unions-
idUSBREA381VT20140409. 
 8.  Northwestern Univ. and College Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 362 NLRB No. 167, 2-
3, (Aug. 17, 2015). Michigan and Ohio soon passed and implemented laws barring student-athletes 
from the right to unionize at all. See OHIO REV. CODE §3345.56 (West, Westlaw though Files 1 to 54 
of the 131st General Assembly (2015-2016) and 2015 State Issues 1 and 2); Definitions; rights of 
public employees, MICH. COMP. LAWS 423.201 (1(e)(iii))) (West, Westlaw through P.A.2016, No. 86 
of the 2016 Regular Session, 98th Legislature). It should be noted that the case as presented was 
specific to unionization at private universities, and did not specify how this decision could affect such 
efforts at public universities in the future. 
 9.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1; see also Sean Gregory, It’s Time to Pay 
College Athletes, TIME (Sept. 16, 2013), http://time.com/568/its-time-to-pay-college-athletes/; 
EVENING INDEP. (Oct, 4, 1951), available at http://www.newspapers.com/newspage/3608625/ 
(reporting on University of Denver (DU) football player Ernest Nemeth’s filing of a worker’s 
compensation claim against DU after injuring his back during spring football practice); State Comp. 
Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957) (denying benefits to the widow of a 
scholarship athlete killed during a football game); Rensing v. Indiana State University Bd. of Trs., 
444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983) (denying recovery to a football player who was rendered a quadriplegic 
during a collegiate sporting event); Coleman v. Western Michigan Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1983) (holding that a scholarship agreement between an athlete and institution does not entitle 
the athlete to workers’ compensation); Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. 
3
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ruling, this Article explores the plausible federal tax consequences should 
student-athletes in the future be deemed employees of their institutions.10 
The language of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) mandates that 
earned income be taxable, no matter the source.11 However, the IRC also 
grants certain exclusions to this canon to include an accommodation that 
an individual’s gross income excludes money received in the form of 
qualified scholarships.12 Thus far, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has 
taken the position that so long as student-athletes are not “required” to 
participate in any specific sport in exchange for scholarship awards, the 
language of the IRC does not prevent students’ scholarships from being 
deemed excludable qualified scholarships.13 Thus, under the purview of 
both the IRC and IRS, student-athletes receiving qualified scholarships do 
not pay income taxes on scholarship moneys received.14 
From a federal income tax perspective, the significance of the 
NLRB’s 2014 Northwestern case as a paradigm for future cases involving 
student-athletes’ unionization mobilization efforts, in conjunction with 
the recent decision in O’Bannon v. NCAA, where former Division I 
athletes settled a $40 million suit against EA Sports for improperly using 
their likenesses in video games, could redefine the principle that select 
student-athletes are no longer unpaid amateurs receiving qualified 
scholarships, but instead are employees of their institutions earning 
scholarship funds in exchange for services rendered as college athletes.15 
Accordingly, a crucial question following the original NLRB holding was 
whether the IRS can logically continue to treat qualified scholarships 
received by student-athletes as excludable from gross income based on 
the language of the IRC or instead reexamine the taxability of student-
 
App.), cert denied, 192 S.E.2d 197 (N.C. 1972) (excusing a university’s obligation to provide 
financial assistance to a student-athlete who refused to play football as a result of his poor academic 
showing). 
 10.  See Sara Ganim, Labor Board: Northwestern University Football Players Can Unionize, 
CNN (Mar. 27, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/26/us/northwestern-football-union/; 
see also WithumSmith+Brown, CPAs, supra note 6; Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, supra 
note 1. 
 11.  IRC § 61(a) (LEXIS 2015). 
 12.  IRC § 117(a) (LEXIS 2015). 
 13.  Potuto et al., supra note 4, at 890 n.40 (referencing commentary within note 40 with respect 
to the exclusion of qualified scholarships from the parameters of IRC § 117(c)). 
 14.  IRC § 117(c)(1) provides that the exclusion for qualified scholarships does not apply to 
amounts received which represent “payment for teaching, research, or other services by the student 
required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship . . . .” 
 15.  See Tom Farrey, Players, Game Makers Settle for $40M, USA TODAY (May 31, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11010455/college-athletes-reach-40-million-settlement-ea-
sports-ncaa-licensing-arm; see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
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athletes’ qualified scholarships.16 
The momentum of law surrounding student-athletes’ employment 
characterization indicates that qualified scholarships could be heavily 
scrutinized in the future and found to fall within the scope of taxable 
federal income.  The purpose of this Article, then, is to analyze the 
potential taxability of qualified scholarships should student-athletes be 
deemed employees of their institutions. To achieve this objective, Part II 
offers a brief history of judicial scrutiny surrounding the pay-for-play 
model within college athletics; Part III analyzes the language of the IRC 
and related Treasury Regulations as they apply to qualified scholarships; 
Part IV evaluates the potential characterization of student-athletes as 
employees of their universities; and Part V concludes that the IRS and 
courts may categorize at least some scholarship athletes as employees of 
their institutions in the future, which may cultivate a new era in the taxing 
of qualified scholarships under federal income tax law.17 
II. THE NLRB V. NORTHWESTERN—THE PAY-FOR-PLAY MODEL GAINS 
TRACTION 
After Johnny Manziel first flashed his infamous “show me the 
money” hand gesture during the 2013 NCAA college football season, the 
issue of paying student-athletes has garnered heavy media attention.18 
 
 16.  See David Murphy & Christopher Amundsen, What Exactly is the Long-Term Impact of 
the NLRB’s Decision? Part 3, DORSEY (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.dorsey.com/eu-nlrb-decision-
college-athletes-and-unions-pt3/. It should be noted that in addition to the NCAA’s principle of 
amateurism, the NCAA currently considers pay as an extra benefit, a term that could render a student-
athlete ineligible for competition. See NCAA MANUAL 12.1.2, Amateur Status (“An individual loses 
amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the 
individual: (a) Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport; 
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate 
athletics participation; (c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, 
regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received, except as permitted in Bylaw 
12.2.5.1; . . . (d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other 
form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based on athletics skill or 
participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations; (e) Competes on any professional 
athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.8, even if no pay or remuneration for expenses was received, except 
as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1; (f ) After initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a 
professional draft (see Bylaw 12.2.4); (g) Enters into an agreement with an agent.”). 
 17.  The purpose of this Article is to specifically address specified federal income tax 
implications on the pay-for-play model of college sports. Although the authors acknowledge that state 
and local taxes will likewise have an impact on this model, such analysis is outside the scope of this 
Article. For more information on the state tax implications of paying student-athletes, see Kisska-
Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1. 
 18.  See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 9; see also Sharon Terlep & Ben Cohen, Judge Rules Against 
NCAA Ban on Paying Players, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-rules-
against-ncaa-ban-on-paying-players-1407539820; Steve Siebold, It’s Time to Pay College Athletes, 
5
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However, while currently on the front line of public debate, the 
investigation into whether student-athletes should be paid is not a new 
phenomenon.19 The origin of this discussion arose in the 1950s in 
Colorado when the judicial system first embarked on analyses of whether 
injured student-athletes qualified for workers’ compensation under state 
law.20 
Courts in different jurisdictions have used several analyses to 
determine whether students are considered employees of their 
universities. Colorado has considered whether student-athletes were 
entitled to workers’ compensation for injuries sustained.21 Other state 
cases have consistently sided with arguments of the NCAA and member 
universities in finding that student athletes are unpaid amateurs.22 The 
O’Bannon case demonstrates an evolution in the law as athletes have 
gained rights to some form of financial remuneration generated in their 
role with the university.23 This culminated in the case of NLRB v. 
Northwestern, which considered football players’ ability to unionize.24 
In University of Denver v. Nemeth, the Colorado Supreme Court 
found that Ernest Nemeth, a college football player who had also been 
employed and compensated by the university in various capacities in 
 
HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Oct. 13, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-
siebold/its-time-to-pay-college-athletes_b_5672988.html; Andrew Steadman, College Athletics For 
Sale?, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 10 (2014), available at https://www.law.ufl.edu/uflaw/feature/college-
athletics-for-sale (cover story of the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law Annual 
Report Issue); Skip Bayless, Unleash the Boosters—drop the false idol of amateurism in college 
sports, ESPN COLLEGE FOOTBALL (July 25, 2014), http://espn.go.com/college-
football/story/_/id/11260822/college-football-paying-athletes. 
 19.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1; see also Dennis A. Johnson & John 
Acquaviva, Point/Counterpoint: Paying College Athletes, SPORT J. (June 15, 2012), 
http://thesportjournal.org/article/pointcounterpoint-paying- college-athletes/ (exploring the history 
and evolution of the discussion of whether or not student-athletes should be paid); Gregory, supra 
note 9 (arguing that because college sports equate to mass entertainment, it is time to reward players 
for their work). 
 20.  See, e.g., Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953); see also Univ. of Denver 
v. Indus. Comm’n of Colorado, 335 P.2d 292 (Colo. 1959) (holding that private agreements may 
neither violate public policy nor abrogate statutory requirements or conditions affecting the public 
policy of the state. Nemeth, whose compensation had been awarded incrementally and who asked for 
additional workers’ compensation due to a change in his condition, was granted a reopening of his 
case.); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957) (denying benefits to the 
widow of a student-athlete killed during a football game). 
 21.  See, e.g., Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423; see also Univ. of Denver v. Indus. Comm’n of Colorado, 
335 P.2d 292. 
 22.  See, e.g., State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 34 P.2d 288. 
 23.  See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007-08 (N.D. Cal.), aff’d in part and rev’d 
in part, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. Cal. 2015). 
 24.  Northwestern Univ. and College Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 44 
(2015). 
6
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exchange for his participation on the football team, qualified for workers’ 
compensation after sustaining injuries during a football practice.25 Four 
years later, in State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial 
Commission, the Colorado Supreme Court denied workers’ compensation 
benefits to the widow of a student-athlete killed during a football game, 
finding no existence of a contractual obligation to play football between 
the decedent and the university, thereby negating any claim for 
compensation.26 During that same decade, the NCAA coined the term 
“student-athlete,” which the organization then rapidly embedded into all 
of its rules and interpretations.27 
Following the early Colorado workers’ compensation decisions, 
several other state courts heard similar claims made by student-athletes, 
and consistently followed the NCAA’s position that student-athletes are 
not employees of their universities.28 For over half a century, the NCAA 
and its member institutions have rigorously defended that student-athletes 
are unpaid amateurs.29 However, the more recent surge in financial 
benefits afforded to the NCAA and its member institutions from lucrative 
television rights has increased scrutiny over whether some portion of this 
wealth should be directed towards student-athletes themselves.30 
 
 25.  Nemeth, 257 P.2d. at 430. 
 26.  State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d at 289-90. 
 27.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1 at 20; see also Taylor Branch, The Shame of 
College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-
shame-of-college-sports/308643/ (“We crafted the term student-athlete,” Walter Byers [the NCAA’s 
first Executive Director] himself wrote, “and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and 
interpretations.”). 
 28.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1; see also, e.g., Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. 
of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. 1983) (reversing and holding that the resulting disability to the 
scholarship athlete nevertheless did not establish that either party had the intent to enter into an 
employer-employee relationship); Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1983) (holding that WMU had little control over Coleman, and even if it did, Coleman’s football 
skills were not an integral part of WMU’s school business); Waldrep v. Texas Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 
S.W.3d 692 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that TCU did not direct or control all of Waldrep’s 
activities as a football player before suffering his spinal cord injury which led to paralysis). But see 
Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (holding in favor of 
the wife of California State Polytechnic football team member who successfully brought a workers’ 
compensation claim to recover for the death of her husband as a result of a plane crash while returning 
from a game). 
 29.  Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1. 
 30.  Id.; see also Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-
athletes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“And what does the labor force have that makes it possible for 
coaches to earn millions, and causes marketers to spend billions, get? Nothing. The workers are 
supposed to be content with a scholarship that does not even cover the full cost of attending college. 
Any student athlete who accepts an unapproved, free hamburger from a coach, or even a fan, is in 
violation of N.C.A.A. rules.”). 
7
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Although the NCAA has not officially amended its posture on the 
pay-for-play model, recent court cases, coupled with the March 2014 
NLRB ruling, have made significant strides in attempting to establish that 
student-athletes are more than mere unpaid amateurs.31 In 2009, Sam 
Keller, a former Division I college quarterback, and Ed O’Bannon, a 
former UCLA basketball player, merged separately-filed lawsuits into a 
single suit against the NCAA, labeled the NCAA v. Student-Athlete Name 
& Likeness Licensing Litigation.32 Keller, O’Bannon, and a group of 
former and current Division I student-athletes claimed that the 
characteristics of the players in the NCAA Football video series mirrored 
theirs and those of other actual college athletes, violating their right of 
publicity and image rights.33 In addition to seeking damages from the use 
of their likenesses in video games, the O’Bannon suit further claimed the 
NCAA was violating federal antitrust law in preventing student-athletes 
from capitalizing on their names and likenesses, specifically with regard 
to the use of their likenesses in Electronic Arts (EA) Sports’ video 
games.34 
After years of court filings, in May and June 2014, both EA Sports 
and the NCAA offered settlement agreements to the plaintiffs involved in 
the NCAA v. Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation 
case.35 The settlement culminated with a $40 million agreement in which 
EA Sports paid the plaintiffs for improperly using the likenesses of 
student-athletes.36 In addition, for the first time in NCAA history, the 
organization agreed to pay $20 million to student-athletes for rights 
relating to their play on the field and for their contribution to the profitable 
nature of college athletics.37 
Following these settlement agreements, a series of legal decisions 
 
 31.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1; see also, Mark Koba, Student-Athletes to Get 
Paid? It Looks That Way, NBC NEWS (Aug. 12, 2014, 7:23 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/student-athletes-get- paid-it-looks-way-n178131. 
 32.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1, at 22; see also, Keller v. Elec. Arts. Inc. (In 
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); John 
Wolohan, Update on O’Bannon v. NCAA, LAWINSPORT (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/intellectual-property-law/item/update-on-o-bannon-v-ncaa 
(discussing the merger of lawsuits filed against the NCAA). 
 33.  Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271-73; see also Wolohan, supra note 32. 
 34.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1 at 22-23; see also Wolohan, supra note 32 
(discussing the various lawsuits involved by and the specific issues brought forth against the NCAA). 
 35.  See Farrey, supra note 15. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  See Rob Dauster, NCAA Settles for $20 Million in Keller v. NCAA Lawsuit, NBC SPORTS 
(Jun. 9, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://collegebasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/06/09/ncaa-settles-for-20-
million-in-keller-v-ncaa-lawsuit/. 
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emerged, demonstrating that the judicial branch did not share the same 
position on amateurism as the NCAA. For example, on August 8, 2014, a 
California district court judge ruled in favor of O’Bannon, who had 
continued his federal antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA.38 This decision 
resulted in a short-lived rejection of the NCAA’s principle of 
“amateurism,” though it did not affect the NCAA’s current stance on not 
paying student athletes under a pay-for-play model.39 However, according 
to the decision, beginning in 2016 universities could have offered select 
football and basketball players individual trust funds that could be 
accessed after graduation.40 Senior District Judge Claudia Wilken of the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held that the 
relevant NCAA member institutions may provide deferred compensation 
of $5,000 or less.41 Almost immediately thereafter, in October of 2014 the 
University of Texas’s athletics director had announced the intention to 
pay each of its student-athletes a sum of money covering the cost of 
attendance, coupled with its deferred compensation for likeness rights, 
beginning fall 2015.42 The O’Bannon decision did not affect the NCAA’s 
 
 38.  O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (Per this ruling, the NCAA 
has the ability to cap compensation at $5,000 per year above the value of full college scholarships.); 
see also Koba, supra note 31 (documenting the O’Bannon decision). 
 39.  See Tom Farrey, Ed O’Bannon: Ruling is Tip of Iceberg, ESPN (Aug. 10, 2014, 10:09 
AM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11332816/ed-obannon-says-antitrust-ruling-only-
beginning-change (noting that the O’Bannon decision is a significant start towards the outright 
rejection of the NCAA’s amateurism model); see also Rick Maese, O’Bannon v. NCAA Ruling Could 
Set Up Larger Arguments over College Sports, Experts Say, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/obannon-v-ncaa-ruling- could-set-up-larger-
arguments-over-college-sports-experts-say/2014/08/09/5338ae4c-1fe2-11e4-9b6c-
12e30cbe86a3_story.html (detailing that in the aftermath of the O’Bannon decision, the NCAA “has 
given no indication it is eager to embrace any form of pay-for-play model”). 
 40.  Ben Strauss & Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Must Allow College to Pay Athletes, Judge Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/sports/federal-judge-rules-against-
ncaa-in-obannon-case.html?_r=0 (noting that football players in the top ten conferences and all 
Division I men’s basketball players could be offered trust funds which can be accessed after 
graduation, giving players an opportunity to share the television revenue they help generate for their 
colleges and the NCAA). 
 41.  Judge Rules Against NCAA, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2014, 6:20 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/11328442/judge-rules-ncaa-ed-obannon-antitrust-case (U.S. District Judge Claudia 
Wilken, in a 99-page decision finding in favor of O’Bannon, found that “the NCAA rules 
unreasonably restrain trade in the market for certain educational and athletic opportunities offered by 
NCAA Division I schools.” However, she did rule that individual schools can offer less money so 
long as they do not unlawfully conspire among themselves to set those amounts.).  
 42.  See Zach Barnett, Texas Will Begin Paying Each of Its Athletes $10,000 A Year, FOOTBALL 
SCOOP (Oct. 22, 2014), http://footballscoop.com/news/texas-will-begin-paying-athletes-10000-year/; 
see also Jason McIntyre, Texas is NOT Paying Each Athlete $10,000, But AD Steve Patterson Said 
They Might if UT Loses in Court, THE BIG LEAD (Oct. 22, 2014, 11:46 PM), 
http://thebiglead.com/2014/10/22/texas-is-not-paying-each-athlete-10000-but-ad-steve-patterson-
said-they-might-if-ut-loses-in-court/ (disputing the original claim that Texas will pay each student-
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stance on the pay-for-play model, but the 2014 NLRB ruling appeared to 
open the door for student-athletes to be deemed employees of their 
institutions.43 
Then, on March 26, 2014, the NLRB ruled that Northwestern 
University football players qualified as employees of the institution and 
could unionize and bargain collectively.44 In making its decision, the 
NLRB distinguished its ruling from that of its 2004 Brown University 
decision where it held that graduate research assistants were not university 
employees eligible for union representation.45 The NLRB reasoned that 
Brown University graduate assistants’ activities were primarily 
educational, whereas Northwestern University athletes’ activities were 
largely “economic.”46 This ruling specifically established that 
Northwestern scholarship football players could unionize based on certain 
factors, including the extent of time devoted to their sport, the level of 
control exerted by coaches, and their scholarship agreements.47 However, 
following this decision, Northwestern University immediately filed an 
appeal with the NLRB in Washington, D.C., which proved to be fatal to 
the impact of the 2014 decision.48 
Later, Samantha Sackos, a former soccer player at the University of 
Houston, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana naming the NCAA and all NCAA Division I member 
 
athlete $10,000, but noting that such payment will occur if the University of Texas loses in court). 
 43.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 44.  See Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1 at 13-14; see also Bennett, supra note 1; 
Strauss & Elder, supra note 1. 
 45.  See Joel Barras, NLRB Regional Director Says College Athletes Can Unionize, FORBES 
(March 27, 2014, 12:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2014/03/27/nlrb-
regional-director-says-college- athletes-can-unionize/; see also Brown Univ. and Int’l Union, Case 
No. 1-RC-21368, slip op. 342 N.L.R.B. 42 (2004) available at http://www.google.com/
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2 
Fmynlrb.nlrb.gov%2Flink%2Fdocument.aspx%2F09031d45800076ac&ei=P8yJVNWQKqPasATnt
ILABA&usg=A FQjCNEEQblA-
f_mbwIJ5xesCybHQd9jug&sig2=xUpCeOWQxvFncEWiHHfXKQ&bvm=bv.81456516,d.cWc 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 46.  See Brown Univ., Case 1-RC-21368, slip op. 342 N.L.R.B. 42 (2004); see also Sara Hebel, 
Employees or Not? Graduate-Student Assistants Versus Scholarship Athletes, CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC. (Mar. 27, 2014), https://chronicle.com/article/Employees-or-Not-/145573/ (analyzing the 
Brown University decision, in which the NLRB ruled that “students serving as graduate-student 
assistants spend only a limited number of hours performing their duties, and it is beyond dispute that 
their principal time commitment at Brown is focused on obtaining a degree and, thus, being a 
student”). 
 47.  See Strauss & Elder, supra note 1. 
 48.  Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 1, at 14; see also Becker, supra note 7. In 2015, the 
NLRB overruled the 2014 decision. See Northwestern Univ., 362 NLRB No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
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institutions as defendants.49 The suit alleged that the NCAA and its 
Division I member schools violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
by failing to pay college athletes for hours worked while practicing and 
playing college sports.50 This complaint asserted that students who 
participate in paid, work-study, part-time employment programs are 
treated differently than NCAA Division I student-athletes pursuant to 
NCAA Bylaws, and contends that student-athletes meet the criteria for 
recognition as temporary employees of NCAA Division I member schools 
under the FLSA.51 Sackos claimed that since student-athletes receive no 
academic credit for participating on a sports team, they should be 
characterized as employees under the FLSA.52 
All of these examples—from the early Colorado workers’ 
compensation rulings to the Northwestern University (NLRB), Keller, and 
O’Bannon decisions to the Sackos filing—continued to shape the debate 
over whether student-athletes should be paid.53 As the idea of paying 
student-athletes continues to gain traction, an important issue to consider 
is whether student-athletes, ultimately characterized as employees of their 
institutions, could eventually be taxed on scholarship moneys received 
from their institutions. While the language in the IRC generally excludes 
qualified scholarships from federal taxation, changing the nature of the 
relationship between student-athletes and their universities could 
transform the manner in which the IRS classifies scholarship income.54 
 
 49.  Sackos v. NCAA, No. 1:14-CV-1710 WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind. Oct. 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/243718053/Samantha-Sackos-v-NCAA-and-NCAA- Division-I-
Member-Schools (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). 
 50.  Id. See also Jonathan L. Israel, The Next Cleat Drops . . . College Athletes Sue for Unpaid 
Wages, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 3, 2014), 
http://www.laboremploymentperspectives.com/2014/11/03/the- next-cleat-drops-college-athletes-
sue-for-unpaid-wages/. 
 51.  Sackos, No. 1:14-CV-1710 WTL-MJD. 
 52.  Id.; see also Kevin Trahan, Lawsuit Alleges NCAA is Breaking Minimum Wage Laws, 
SBNATION (Oct. 22, 2014, 6:19 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/2014/10/22/7042297/lawsuit-
alleges-ncaa-is-breaking-minimum-wage-laws; But see Steve Berkowitz, Judge Dismisses NCAA 
Wage Lawsuit Involving Penn Track Athletes, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2016) (offering that U.S. District 
Court (S.D. Ind.) Judge William T. Lawrence dismissed the [Sackos] case against over 100 Division 
I NCAA member schools holding that Congress did not intend the FLSA to apply to student-athletes 
in the first place). The authors note that since the time of the original Sackos filing, Sackos actually 
resigned from the case and former University of Pennsylvania Women’s Track and Field athletes 
Gillian Berger, Lauren Anderson, and Taylor Henning became the named plaintiffs in the lawsuit. 
See Berger v. NCAA, Cover Letter to Amended Complaint, Civil Action No. 1:14-CV-1710 WTL-
MJD. 
 53.  NLRB v. Northwestern, 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,781 
(2014); Keller v. NCAA 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71433 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014); O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Sackos, No. 1:14-CV-1710 WTL-MJD. 
 54.  See IRC § 117(a) (LEXIS 2015); see also Michael Sanserino, College Athletes Union 
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As such, an understanding of the taxability of qualified scholarships in the 
wake of the NLRB’s 2014 Northwestern decision, though it was later 
overturned and dismissed the following year, is critical in identifying the 
potential impact such a decision could have on student-athletes’ 
scholarship funds in the future.55 
III. HISTORY IN THE MAKING—TAXING ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS IN 
THE WAKE OF THE NLRB’S 2014 NORTHWESTERN DECISION 
The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution authorizes 
Congress to tax income, no matter the source.56 On October 3, 1913, the 
same year that the Sixteenth Amendment took effect, Congress approved 
a tax on the net income of individuals and corporations.57 Since the 1954 
revision of the IRC, the language of Code Section 61 explicitly defines 
the term “gross income” to include “all income from whatever source 
derived.”58 
The following sections discuss how the compensation of student 
athletes is viewed by the IRS, and analyzes the Supreme Court rulings that 
have tried to define compensation. Subsection III.A explores how the IRS 
taxes qualified scholarships. Subsection III.B covers the limiting 
definition of “compensation for services rendered.” The Court has held 
that scholarship money that is really compensation for services is taxable 
under the quid pro quo analysis of Bingler. However, the IRS and courts 
considering the issue have not applied the quid pro quo Bingler analysis 
directly to student-athletes’ scholarships. If the issue is considered by the 
IRS and courts, it is likely that the portion of student-athlete scholarships 
that are deemed “compensation for services rendered” will be taxable 
income. 
The IRC purposefully grants certain exclusions to the Section 61 
canon, including an accommodation under Section 117 that an 
individual’s gross income exclude money received in the form of qualified 
 
Raises Tax, Discrimination Questions, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Apr. 6, 2014, 12:07 AM), 
http://www.post- gazette.com/business/employment/2014/04/06/College-athletes-union-raises-tax-
discrimination- questions/stories/201404030298 (noting that a change in employment 
characterization of student-athletes at the universities they play for may require that the IRS look 
more closely at the taxability of scholarship money). 
 55.  NLRB v. Northwestern, 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221; but see Northwestern Univ. and 
College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), 362 NLRB No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
 56.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 57.  See REVENUE ACT OF 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913), last amended by Pub. L. 95-600, 
92 Stat. 2763 (1978); see also Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1022 (1997) (providing a brief history of U.S. taxation). 
 58.  IRC § 61(a) (LEXIS 2015). 
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scholarships.59 An important limitation to this exclusion requires that if 
any “portion of scholarship money received . . . represents a payment for 
teaching, research or other services by the student required as a condition 
for receiving the qualified scholarship . . . ,” such funds are taxable.60 
From a federal income tax perspective, the significance of the 
NLRB’s 2014 Northwestern decision lay in the interpretation of whether, 
as employees of their private institution, Northwestern University football 
players—along with other student-athletes in similar situations—would 
be found to receive some or all of their scholarship money in exchange 
for services required as a condition for receiving their scholarship 
money.61 To advance this issue, an understanding of IRC Section 117 and 
the corresponding Treasury Regulations is necessary.62 
A. Taxing Qualified Scholarships—Understanding IRC Section 117 
Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, no specific exclusion 
existed within the language of the IRC governing the omission of 
scholarship money from the parameters of federal income taxation.63 Such 
a bright line tenet was not implemented into the structure of the IRC until 
the Congressional enactment of Code Section 117 in 1954, which 
specifically excluded scholarship and fellowship grants from the 
taxability of gross income.64 
The original scholarship exclusion was largely eroded in 1986 when 
Congress required (1) that scholarships be taxable to the extent of the 
value of services provided, (2) limited the exclusions for degree 
candidates to amounts for qualified tuition and related expenses, and (3) 
compelled that all grants for living expenses be taxable.65 A primary 
objective of the federal government enacting Section 117 was to 
encourage and provide access to students seeking higher education, 
 
 59.  See IRC § 117(a) (LEXIS 2015). 
 60.  IRC § 117(c) (LEXIS 2015). 
 61.  NLRB v. Northwestern, 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,781 
(2014). 
 62.  IRC § 117(a); Treas. Reg., §§ 1.117-1(a), 1.117-3(b), and 1.117-4(c) (LEXIS through Oct. 
28, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register).  
 63.  Richard C.E. Beck, Loan Repayment Assistance Programs for Public-Interest Lawyers: 
Why Does Everyone Think They are Taxable?, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 251, 258 (1996) (Providing a 
brief history of tax exclusions for scholarships); see also Mimi Sharamitaro, Comment: The Federal 
Tax System and Treatment of Scholarships For Graduate Students: Should Scholarships Be Taxed?, 
48 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1501, 1502-03 (2004) (noting that prior to 1954, scholarships were excludible under 
the general provision of the Internal Revenue Code exempting gifts). 
 64.  See IRC § 117 (LEXIS 2015); see also Beck, supra note 63, at 258. 
 65.  See Beck, supra note 63, at 260-61; see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 
123, 100 Stat. 2085, 2112 (codified at IRC § 117(a) (1994)); IRC § 117(b) (LEXIS 2015). 
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notwithstanding income level.66 Today, Section 117 excludes from gross 
income amounts received as qualified scholarships by individuals who are 
candidates for degrees at educational institutions.67 It is the sole 
Congressional provision excluding such amounts from gross income.68 
Generally, the term “qualified scholarship” includes amounts 
received by individuals as scholarship funds used for qualified tuition and 
related expenses, including fees, books, supplies, and equipment required 
for courses of instruction, to aid in the pursuit of study or research.69 In 
order to be treated as related expenses, fees, books, supplies, and 
equipment must be required of all students in the specified course of 
instruction.70 Scholarship money used for incidental expenses, such as 
room, board, travel, and research, is not excludable from gross income.71 
Section 117 further mandates that scholarship recipients be 
candidates for a degree at an educational organization to qualify for the 
tax exclusion.72 Specifically, amounts paid to an individual to help pursue 
their studies or to conduct research are considered Section 117 scholarship 
amounts “if the primary purpose of the studies or research is to further the 
education and training of the recipient in his individual capacity . . . .”73 
Such requirement entails that the student attend a primary or secondary 
school or be an undergraduate or graduate student pursuing a degree at a 
 
 66.  See Sharamitaro, supra note 63, at 1503. 
 67.  See IRC § 117(a); see also IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (defining the term “educational 
organization” as “an educational organization which normally maintains a regular faculty and 
curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or student in attendance at the place 
where its educational activities are regularly carried on”); Stuart Lazar, Schooling Congress: The 
Current Landscape of the Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenses and a Framework for Reform, 
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1047, 1083 (2010) (discussing the tax exclusion for scholarships and 
fellowship grants). 
 68.  See Lazar, supra note 67, at 1083-84; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.117-1(a) (LEXIS through 
Oct. 28, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register). 
 69.  IRC § 117(b)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a) (LEXIS through Oct. 28, 2015 issue of 
the Fed. Register) (The term qualified scholarship also applies to fellowship grants received by 
individuals and used for qualified tuition and related expenses.); Lazar, supra note 67, at 1084 
(discussing the inclusion of related expenses within the parameter of IRC Section 117); IRC § 
117(b)(2)(A) (defining the term “qualified tuition and related expenses” as “tuition and fees required 
for the enrollment or attendance of a student at an educational organization . . . .”). 
 70.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(2), 53 Fed. Reg. 21688 (Jun. 9, 1988). 
 71.  IRC § 117(b)(1); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(2); Lazar, supra note 67, at 1084 
(noting those items associated with scholarship and fellowship grants which are includable in gross 
income). 
 72.  IRC § 117(a); see also IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (defining the term “educational 
organization” as a facility that “normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has 
a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational 
activities are regularly carried on”); Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(b) (LEXIS through the Nov. 4, 2015 issue 
of the Fed. Register). 
 73.  Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(2) (1988). 
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college or university.74 
Although Section 117 and the applicable Treasury Regulations offer 
tax exclusions for scholarship recipients pursing educational studies or 
research, a key limitation applies if any scholarship amounts “represent 
either compensation for past, present, or future employment services or 
represents payment for services which are subject to the direction or 
supervision of the grantor.”75 Prior to 1986, students receiving funds 
representing payment for services could exclude such amounts received 
from their gross income so long as all candidates were performing the 
same services.76 However, such exclusion was repealed by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.77 
Under the present Code, IRS Regulations clarify that scholarship 
amounts paid to recipients representing compensation or payment for 
services are specifically not excludable from gross income.78 Treasury 
Regulation § 1.117-4(c), promulgated under Code Section 117, 
purposefully identifies scholarship amounts representing compensation 
for services as includable in gross income and therefore taxable.79 In 1969, 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of Treasury Regulation § 
1.117-4(c), denying a scholarship exclusion from gross income where 
tuition represented compensation for services.80 Therefore, an 
understanding of the language of this Treasury Regulation, along with 
judicial interpretations, follows. 
B. Compensation for Services Rendered—Treasury Regulation § 1.117-
4(c) and Judicial Interpretation. 
The IRC has specific statutory sections in place governing qualified 
scholarship funds. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Tax Court have 
applied the applicable Treasury Regulations to scholarship recipients and 
 
 74.  Lazar, supra note 67, at 1084-85 (noting the IRC Section 117 requirements that an 
individual receiving a scholarship or grant be a candidate for degree at a qualified educational 
organization); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(4) 53 Fed. Reg. 21688 (Jun. 9, 1988). 
 75.  Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(1) (LEXIS through Nov. 4, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register). 
 76.  Sharamitaro, supra note 63, at 1502-04. 
 77.  Id.; see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2112 (1986). 
 78.  See IRC § 117(c)(1) (LEXIS 2015); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(2). 
 79.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c). 
 80.  See Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969) (finding that respondent-engineers, 
participating in a fellowship program which required both a “work-study” obligation requiring that 
they work part-time while attending university classes, and a “research” obligation which provided 
respondents a leave of absence to work on their doctoral dissertations, was taxable because 
respondents had provided services in exchange for their scholarship money); see also Adam Hoeflich, 
Note, The Taxation of Athletic Scholarships: A Problem of Consistency, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 
589-92 (1991). 
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have consistently held that there must be a quid pro quo in order for the 
scholarship funds to be taxable.81 In situations in which students’ 
scholarship money is dependent upon rendering services to the university, 
the Courts have held that the funds are taxable income.82 
The primary objective of Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4 is to 
earmark circumstances where tuition remission represents compensation 
for services, and thereby deny the application of the Section 117 
scholarship exclusion from taxability.83 Payments are not considered 
scholarship amounts or fellowship grants if: (1) the amount represents 
compensation for “past, present or future employment purposes,” (2) the 
activity the scholarship or grant payment funds is “subject to the direction 
or supervision of the grantor,” or (3) the amount paid enables the recipient 
“to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor.”84 
Over the years, various courts have scrutinized the application of 
Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c) to scholarship recipients.85 However, 
the premier case characterizing the proper application of this regulation is 
Bingler v. Johnson.86 In Bingler, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
taxpayers who provide services in exchange for their scholarship grants—
quid pro quo—may not exclude the value of such grants from their gross 
income.87 The taxpayers in this case—engineers at Westinghouse—
sought to exclude amounts received by their employer from income while 
attending graduate school in pursuit of their Ph.D. degrees.88 The 
respondents in Bingler participated in a fellowship program requiring both 
work-study and research obligations.89 The work-study segment entailed 
that the respondents work part-time and obtain a part-time release from 
 
 81.  E.g., Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969); Willie v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 383, 386 (1971).  
 82.  E.g., Bingler, 394 U.S. 741; Willie, 57 T.C. at 386. 
 83.  See Wendy Gerzog Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification of 
Historical Inequities, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 434 (1985). 
 84.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(1), (2). 
 85.  See e.g., Willie 57 T.C. at 386 (1971) (Petitioner, an instructor employed by the Biloxi 
School District, participated in an education program funded through the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW). Although not required, the Biloxi School District encouraged 
teachers to participate in the program with the goal of improving the education of children and 
providing teachers with teaching and coping methods to be utilized in the newly desegregated schools 
in the area. Petitioner did not include the reimbursed amount of his attendance in his taxable income 
for the year at issue. Finding that the payments received by the HEW represented compensation for 
services rendered, the U.S. Tax Court held that petitioner’s participation in the training program was 
primarily for the benefit of the Biloxi School District, and therefore includable in his gross income.).  
 86.  394 U.S. 741 (1969). 
 87.  Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 589. 
 88.  See Bingler, 394 U.S. at 742; see also Gary C. Randall, Athletic Scholarships and Taxes: 
Or a Touchdown In Taxes, 7 GONZ. L. REV. 297, 300 (1972) (reviewing the Bingler case in detail). 
 89.  See Bingler, 394 U.S. at 742-44; see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 589-90. 
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work to attend university classes, while the research obligation allowed 
the respondents a leave of absence from employment to work on their 
doctoral dissertations.90 Westinghouse paid the respondents’ tuition and 
expenses during the work-study phase, as well as a stipend during the 
research phase of the program.91 The taxpayers contended that the 
stipends received from Westinghouse during the research phase of the 
fellowship program were scholarship amounts and should be excludable 
from gross income.92 
Endorsing the legitimacy of Treasury Regulation 1.117-4(c) in its 
review of this case, the Bingler Court remarked: 
[T]he definitions supplied by the Regulation clearly are prima facie 
proper, comporting as they do with the ordinary understanding of 
“scholarships” and “fellowships” as relatively disinterested, “no-
strings” educational grants, with no requirement of any substantial quid 
pro quo from the recipients.93 
In making this statement, the U.S. Supreme Court stressed the importance 
of the quid pro quo test, maintaining that students who provide services in 
exchange for scholarships or grants may not exclude their awards from 
gross income.94 Specifically, the Court held that a payment cannot be 
earmarked as a scholarship in circumstances “where the recipient receives 
money, and in return provides a quid pro quo.”95 Thus, any amounts 
received in return for services rendered are treated as compensation rather 
than scholarship funds.96 
Apart from Bingler, interpreting Code Section 117 and its applicable 
Treasury Regulations has been articulated in various U.S. Tax Court 
reviews.97 In Bonn v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court held that funds 
 
 90.  Bingler, 394 U.S. at 743-44; see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 590. 
 91.  Bingler 394 U.S. at 743 (the stipends received from Westinghouse ranged from 70-90% of 
the respondents’ prior salaries); see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 590. 
 92.  Bingler, 394 U.S. at 744-45 (Westinghouse, under its in-house accounting program, listed 
the stipend paid to the respondents as “indirect labor” expenses, and withheld the appropriate federal 
income tax from those amounts paid. Respondents subsequently filed claims for income tax refunds); 
see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 590. 
 93.  Bingler, 394 U.S. at 751; see also Randall, supra note 88, at 300. 
 94.  Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 591. 
 95.  Bingler, 394 U.S. at 758 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 22); see also Jonathan M. Layman, 
Comment: Forgiven but Not Forgotten: Taxation of Forgiven Student Loans Under the Income-Based 
Repayment Plan, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 131, 149 (2011). 
 96.  See Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.117-6(d)(2) (1988); see also Ernest R. Larkins, Coming To 
America: International Students Face a Labyrinth of Income Tax Issues, 15 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 47, 70 
(2000). 
 97.  Bingler, 394 U.S.. See, e.g., Bonn v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 64 (1960); Proskey v. Comm’r, 51 
T.C. 918 (1969). 
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received by a physician in exchange for services provided to a Veterans’ 
Administration (VA) hospital under a fellowship program constituted 
compensation for services rather than a fellowship grant.98 In making this 
determination, the Court found that the VA hospital existed primarily for 
patient care and that the needs of the fellowship training program were 
incidental to the valuable services, which petitioner provided to assist in 
the care and treatment of patients in exchange for compensation.99 
Similarly, in Proskey v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court sustained the 
Commissioner of Revenue’s determination that a stipend received by the 
taxpayer, a resident physician, in exchange for his supervisory role over 
medical students, interns, and assistant residents constituted 
compensation for services rendered to the hospital rather than a fellowship 
grant.100 
In Zolnay v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court held that payments 
received by a Ph.D. candidate from his institution were taxable as 
compensation for services rendered and therefore not excludable as a 
scholarship or fellowship grant.101 In this case, the petitioner, a Ph.D. 
candidate in electrical engineering, performed studies for the Ohio State 
University as a research assistant.102 In exchange for his required forty-
hour work weeks, the petitioner received monthly compensation.103 The 
Court, concluding that such payments were compensation in exchange for 
 
 98.  Bonn, 34 T.C. 64 Petitioner, a physician, was accepted into a fellowship program operated 
by the Menninger Foundation, and was appointed by the Veterans’ Administration (VA) to a 
psychiatry residency at a VA hospital under a fellowship program. In consideration for petitioner’s 
services, which included supervising course instruction and training in psychiatry, neuropathology, 
and neurophysiology to medical residents, petitioner received certain funds which she documented 
on her income tax return as being a fellowship grant. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue found 
that the funds received during the tax year at issue to be compensation for valuable services rendered. 
The U.S. Tax Court sustained this decision. Id. at 64-66, 73. 
 99.  Id. at 73. 
 100.  Proskey v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 918 (U.S. Tax Ct. 1969) Petitioner, a licensed physician and 
resident at University Hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan, received yearly monetary stipends during his 
medical residency. The amounts received were based upon the number of years of service that 
petitioner provided as a resident. In return, petitioner supervised the activities of medical students, 
interns, and assistant residents. During the years of his residency, petitioner was not a candidate for a 
degree. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that the stipend received during the tax year at 
issue was compensation for employment services rendered, not a fellowship grant. The U.S. Tax 
Court sustained this determination. Id. at 919-22. 
 101.  Zolnay v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 389, 399 (1968). During that tax period at issue, petitioner 
worked solely on the subject of her thesis, which was not an established University research project, 
thus fulfilling the Masters Program’s degree requirements. During this period, the facts document that 
the University did not treat petitioner as an employee and that the terms of the graduate assistantship 
did not require that she do any teaching or research on University projects while receiving funding. 
Id. at 394. 
 102.  Id. at 394-95. 
 103.  Id. at 396-97. 
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services, noted several considerations, including: (1) petitioner’s forty-
hour work weeks; (2) the requisite supervised activities, planned time 
schedules, and progress reports; (3) the amount paid to petitioner; (4) the 
disconnect between petitioner’s research and his doctoral dissertation; (5) 
the fact that petitioner’s application for a graduate fellowship had been 
disapproved; and (6) that the university regarded petitioner as an 
employee.104 
In contrast to Zolnay, the U.S. Tax Court in Smith v. Comm’r 
determined that funds given by a university to a student working as a 
graduate assistant while completing her Master’s degree constituted a 
scholarship or fellowship grant.105 In its published opinion, the Tax Court 
cited to Bingler and documented several factors used in drawing its 
conclusion, including the fact that petitioner worked only on her studies 
during the tax period at issue, that the University did not receive a direct 
substantial benefit from petitioner’s research, that petitioner did not teach 
or conduct research on any University project during the funding period, 
and that there was no indication that petitioner was required to publish her 
findings in exchange for receiving university funds.106 Although the 
respondent argued that payments made to petitioner were taxable as 
income because they were made in exchange for services rendered to the 
University, the Tax Court denied this argument, finding no quid pro quo 
present.107 
The above case examples articulate the IRS’s treatment of academic 
scholarships as non-taxable income where there is no quid pro quo 
involved.108 However, amounts that represent payment in exchange for 
teaching, research or other services as a condition for receiving the 
scholarship are deemed valuable consideration and therefore taxable as 
income.109 Although the quid pro quo interpretation of Section 117 and 
the Treasury Regulations as enunciated in Bingler seems clear, such 
application has not necessarily been an operational reality at the collegiate 
level, as universities have not yet moved towards treating student-athlete 
scholarships as qualified taxable income.110 
 
 104.  Id. at 397-99. 
 105.  Smith v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1348 (1986). 
 106.  Id. at 1350. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  See Jake Linford, Organ Donation & Human Subjects Research: New Perspectives: The 
Kidney Donor Scholarship Act: How College Scholarships Can Provide Financial Incentives for 
Kidney Donation While Preserving Altruistic Meaning, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 265, 
302 (2009). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id.; see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 592 (noting that the law is clear that if an 
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Numerous scholarly publications have noted a disconnect between 
the imposition of Section 117 and Bingler to athletic grants-in-aid.111 
Although the debate is open as to whether student-athletes actually 
provide services in exchange for their athletic scholarships, the IRS has 
never sought to tax athletic scholarships.112 Of intrigue to this ongoing 
deliberation, on January 21, 2015, two former University of North 
Carolina Chapel Hill (UNC) student-athletes—Rashanda McCants and 
Devon Ramsay—filed a lawsuit against the school and the NCAA 
alleging that they represented hundreds of thousands of student-athletes 
nationwide who were promised an education in return for generating 
millions of dollars in revenue each year, yet receive an inferior 
instruction.113 The complaint accuses the NCAA of knowingly allowing 
 
educational institution requires services of a student in exchange for a grant or stipend, that student 
must include such amount in their gross income). 
 111.  See, e.g., Randall, supra note 88, at 299-309 (analyzing the application of IRC Section 117 
and related case law to the current scholarship model in college athletics and ultimately concluding 
that athletic scholarships should be taxable under the current language of the Code); Hoeflich, supra 
note 80, at 602, 614-17 (scrutinizing the quid pro quo application of Section 117 to athletic 
scholarships, and proposing that the IRS tax student-athletes’ scholarship money, or alternatively 
suggesting that the NCAA change its rules in order to avoid such treatment); Thomas R. Hurst & J. 
Grier Pressly III, Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal & Practical Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. 
L. J. 55, 74 (2000) (noting that it is “widely recognized” that athletic scholarships do not meet the 
exclusionary requirements of IRC Section 117 because student-athletes are required to perform 
athletic services in exchange for receipt of their scholarship money); Daniel Nestel, Note: Athletic 
scholarships: An Imbalance of Power Between the University and the Student-Athlete, 53 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 1401, 1413 (1992) (arguing that athletic scholarships create a quid pro quo relationship between 
the university and student-athlete because student-athletes are required to perform services in 
exchange for their scholarship money); William B. Gould IV, Glenn M. Wong & Eric Weitz, Full 
Court Press: Northwestern University, A New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 
60 (2014) (noting that if the value of an athletic scholarship is deemed a salary, student-athletes may 
be taxed on such income based on the holding in Bingler). 
 112.  See, e.g., Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 592 (observing that because the IRS has never sought 
to tax athletic scholarships, schools must not require services in exchange for scholarship money; 
however, the author further provides that such conundrum indicates otherwise.); see also Nestel, 
supra note 111, at 1413 (scrutinizing that the current language of Section 117 creates a quid pro quo 
relationship as the student-athlete is required to perform services for the university); Robert 
McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as 
Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 86 (2006) (arguing that the NCAA’s insistence on characterizing 
student-athletes as amateurs masks the reality that universities employ players to provide athletic 
services in exchange for compensation); Linford, supra note 108, at 302 (providing that it is uncertain 
why the IRS does not tax athletic scholarships regardless of the fact that it is a bargained-for exchange 
between player and university). 
 113.  See McCants v. NCAA, Class Action Complaint, Jury Trial Demand, 15 CVS 1782 (Super. 
Ct. NC, Jan. 22, 2015), available at http://www.cbssports.com/images/blogs/Hausfeld-complaint.pdf; 
see also Sara Ganim, Lawsuit Claims UNC and NCAA Broke Promises In ‘Spectacular Fashion’, 
CNN (last updated Jan. 23, 2015, 7:58 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/22/us/unc-paper-classes-
lawsuit/index.html (evaluating the lawsuit filed against UNC and the NCAA); Michael McCann & 
John Wertheim, Rashanda McCants, Devon Ramsey file suit against UNC, NCAA, SPORTS 
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member schools to commit academic fraud in promising educations and 
educational opportunities to scholarship student-athletes, and yet failing 
to implement adequate monitoring systems to prevent such fraud from 
occurring.114 Specifically, the lawsuit takes aim at “the NCAA and UNC’s 
abject failure to safeguard and provide a meaningful education to 
[scholarship] athletes who agreed to attend UNC—and take the field—in 
exchange for academically sound instruction.”115 Although this complaint 
does not include a tax issue, the key language within the complaint 
specifying the verbiage in exchange for could pose another interesting 
twist in the future application of IRC Section 117 should taxing athletic 
scholarships stimulate the IRS’s interest in the future.116 
Applying Bingler’s quid pro quo analysis to student-athletes is 
straightforward—if a university requires that the student-athlete perform 
services in exchange for their grant-in-aid, that student may not exclude 
the scholarship amount from gross income.117 An examination of the 
degree of control that universities and coaches exert on student-athletes 
throughout the course of the calendar year, coupled with the compensation 
paid to them in the form of athletic grants-in-aid, and the economic 
dependency of student-athletes on their universities suggest that student-
athletes are in fact paid-to-play.118 Further, a review of the court testimony 
from the O’Bannon case provides strong evidence that certain student-
athletes are required to participate in sports in exchange for their 
scholarship earnings.119 Specifically, during trial, Ed O’Bannon and other 
former student-athletes testified that their job at school was to play sports 
and that playing college sports was their main occupation due to the 
 
ILLUSTRATED (last updated Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.si.com/college-
basketball/2015/01/06/rashanda-mccants-unc-paper-classes-lawsuit (analyzing the McCants v. UNC 
case). 
 114.  Steve Berkowitz, North Carolina, NCAA Sued for Academic Scandal, USA TODAY (Jan. 
22, 2015, 9:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/22/lawsuit-filed-against-
north-carolina-ncaa-on-academic- scandal/22173755/. 
 115.  Steven Ginsburg, Two ex-North Carolina Athletes File Lawsuit Alleging Academic Fraud, 
REUTERS (Jan 22, 2015, 6:12 PM, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/22/us-unc-fraud-lawsuit-
idUSKBN0KV2RO20150122; see also Jon Solomon, Ex-North Carolina athletes sue NCAA, UNC 
over academic scandal, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 22, 2015, 4:20 PM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24984287/ex-unc-athletes-sue-ncaa-
unc-over-academic-scandal (noting that the plaintiffs’ lawyers are seeking an injunctive relief class 
defined as “anyone who attended North Carolina on an athletic scholarship, past or present”). 
 116.  E.g., Solomon, supra note 115. 
 117.  See Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 602. 
 118.  See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 112, at 97-119 (providing a thorough analysis 
of the extent of control that universities have over student-athletes). 
 119.  Id. 
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magnitude of time they were required to devote.120 Finally, the original 
NLRB Northwestern decision reinforced the argument that student-
athletes receive a substantial economic benefit of scholarship money in 
exchange for performing football-related services, under what amounts to 
a contract-for-hire.121 
NCAA member institutions hold vast power which allows them to 
cancel scholarship benefits.122 In order to receive full benefits during the 
term of the scholarship, recipients must be academically eligible, not 
fraudulently misrepresent information on their application, letter of intent, 
or financial aid agreement, not engage in serious misconduct warranting 
substantial disciplinary penalty, and must continue to participate in the 
athletic program.123 Such broad range of university power further 
articulates the possible application of Bingler’s quid pro quo analysis to 
student-athletes.124 
Still, as the IRS has not pronounced any specific interest in pursuing 
athletic scholarships to date, the complex inquiry into whether college 
scholarships are taxable in the future could hinge on whether student-
athletes are identified as actual “employees” of the universities they 
represent.125 The option of compensating student-athletes as scholarship-
earning employees may be more complicated than merely paying them 
monetary compensation or stipends, as such preference presents the 
possibility of future legislative changes to the IRC itself or further judicial 
interpretation of Section 117 with respect to athletic scholarships.126 
Currently, so long as student-athletes are not required to participate 
in any specific sport in exchange for scholarship awards, the language of 
the IRC has not been applied to prevent student-athletes from excluding 
 
 120.  Isaac Brekken, Judge Rules Against NCAA in Ed O’Bannon Case, CBS NEWS (Aug. 8, 
2014, 8:19 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-rules-against-ncaa-in-ed-obannon-case/. 
 121.  WithumSmith+Brown, supra note 6. 
 122.  See NCAA Manual 15.3.4.2; see also Nestel, supra note 111, at 1413 (noting that “the 
NCAA rules only prevent a university from terminating a student-athlete’s scholarship benefits during 
the award term on the basis of injury or athletic ability).  
 123.  See Nestel, supra note 111, at 1413; see also NCAA Manual 15.3.4.2. 
 124.  See Nestel, supra note 11, at 1413; see also Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969). 
 125.  See Hoeflich, supra note 82, at 581; see also Sanserino, supra note 56 (noting the potential 
IRS implications which could emerge from the changing nature of the relationship between student-
athletes and universities). 
 126.  See Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 592 (noting that the IRS has never sought to tax athletic 
scholarships); see also Robert W. Lee, The Taxation of Athletic Scholarships: An Uneasy Tension 
between Benevolence and Consistency, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1985) (documenting that the 
IRS has never sought to tax athletic scholarships); Mike Schinner, Touchdowns and Taxes: Are 
Athletic Scholarships Merely Disguised Compensation?, 8 AM. J. TAX POL’Y. 127, 139 (1990) 
(stating that since enactment of section 117, no court has specifically addressed issue of whether 
athletic scholarships constitute taxable income). 
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their scholarships from gross income.127 Thus, under the purview of the 
current application of Section 117 and Bingler, student-athletes receiving 
qualified scholarships do not pay income taxes on scholarship moneys 
received.128 However, such application could change in the future should 
the NLRB revisit the question as to whether or not to characterize student-
athletes as employees of their institutions. 
Although the IRC does not specifically define the term “services” 
with regard to the application of Section 117, the pertinent Treasury 
Regulations limit “services” to those “in the nature of part-time 
employment required as a condition to receiving the scholarship.”129 
Based on the previous examination and application of Section 117, 
evaluating whether student-athletes’ grant-in-aid money could be taxable 
in the future may pivot on whether student-athletes are deemed to receive 
some or all of their scholarship money in exchange for services required 
as a condition for receiving their scholarship money as employees of their 
institutions.130 To appreciate the potential impact of characterizing 
student-athletes as employees of their institutions from a federal income 
tax perspective, an understanding and application of the employer-
employee relationship is critical. 
IV. THE STUDENT-ATHLETE AS EMPLOYEE—THE FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX PERSPECTIVE 
As previously analyzed, the IRC allows that a taxpayer’s gross 
income not include amounts received as qualified scholarships by 
individuals who are degree candidates at educational institutions.131 
However, as also noted, qualified scholarship awards are limiting in that 
if an educational institution requires services of a student “in exchange” 
for a monetary grant, then the student cannot exclude scholarship amounts 
received from their gross income.132 While the IRC does not specifically 
 
 127.  Potuto et al., supra note 4, at 890 n.40 (referencing commentary within footnote 40 with 
regard to the exclusion of qualified scholarships from the parameters of IRC §117(c)). 
 128.  IRC § 117(c)(1) (LEXIS 2015) (stating that the exclusion for qualified scholarships does 
not apply to amounts received which represent “payment for teaching, research, or other services by 
the student required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship . . .”). 
 129.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-2(a)(1) (LEXIS through the Nov. 4, 2015 issue of the Fed. 
Register). 
 130.  See id.; see also NLRB v. Northwestern, 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 221, 2014-15 NLRB Dec. 
(CCH) ¶ 15,781 (2014). 
 131.  IRC §117(a) (LEXIS 2015). 
 132.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (LEXIS, through Nov. 4, 2015 issue of the Fed. 
Register); see also, Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 592; Hurst & Pressly, supra note 111, at 74 
(documenting that although IRC § 117 does not exclude portions of athletic scholarships constituting 
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define the term “services,” Treasury Regulation 1.117-2 limits services to 
those “in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to 
receiving the scholarship.”133 Although athletic scholarships are not 
currently taxable to the student-athlete, if players are deemed 
“employees” of their institutions, it is feasible that the IRS may eventually 
reevaluate whether student-athletes are receiving part or all of their 
scholarship money in exchange for services rendered.134 
The employee characterization of scholarship athletes indicating a 
shift from the amateur/ education model to the commercial/education 
model could increase the likelihood that athletic scholarships will be 
taxable as gross income.135 Specifically, if any portion of an athletic 
scholarship is found to be granted in exchange for services provided to 
their institution, such portion would constitute taxable income to the 
student-athlete.136 The original NLRB 2014 Northwestern decision 
supported the notion that student-athletes receive a substantial economic 
benefit of scholarship money in exchange for performing football-related 
services, under what amounts to a contract-for-hire.137 A contract-for-hire 
“binds an employer to pay compensation to an employee who performs 
services, sets forth the place to perform such services and the work to be 
performed, and sets the compensation for the performance of such 
work.”138 In the event a contract-for-hire exists, the question is whether 
such contract creates an employer-employee relationship.139 
To thoroughly analyze whether an employer-employee relationship 
exists between student-athletes and their universities, Subsection IV.A 
explores the various tests used to determine whether a scholarship falls 
 
room and board from gross income, few student-athletes report room and board as income, and the 
IRS has not pursued the issue); Schinner, supra note 126, at 146-48, 155 (noting that room, board, or 
incidental expenses must be included in a recipient’s gross income); Lee, supra note 126, at 595 
(stating that IRC § 117(c) applies to scholarship athletes because they must be degree candidates). 
 133.  Treas. Reg. § 1.117-2(a)(1) (LEXIS through the Nov. 4, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register). 
 134.  See infra notes 174-210 and accompanying text. 
 135.  Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25 
RUTGERS L.J. 269, 323 (1994) (providing that “under the amateur/education model, the student-
athlete is viewed as an amateur, and college athletics is considered an integral part of the education 
purpose of universities.” Id. at 273. Under the commercial/education model, education still remains a 
component; however, a predominant characteristic is that college athletics is a commodity capitalizing 
on “the potential benefits of a successful athletic program.”). Id. at 279-80. 
 136.  See IRC § 117(c)(1) (LEXIS 2015); see also C. Peter Goplerud III, Symposium: Sports 
Law As A Reflection Of Society’s Laws And Values: Pay for Play For College Athletes: Now, More 
Than Ever, S. TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1102 (1997). 
 137.  WithumSmith+Brown, supra note 6. 
 138.  Davis, supra note 135, at 283; see also Ray Yasser, Are Scholarship Athletes at Big-Time 
Programs Really University Employees?—You Bet They Are!, 9 THE BLACK L.J. 65, 65 (1984). 
 139.  Davis, supra note 135, at 284. 
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within taxable income. First Subsection IV.A.1 reveals that the IRS 
twenty-factor test and some state workers’ compensation cases support 
construction of the student-athlete as an employee. Subsection IV.A.2 
concludes that the economic realities test used under FLSA and by some 
states for workers’ compensation supports finding student-athletes as 
employees. Additionally, Subsection IV.A.3 addresses a hybrid test for 
federal discrimination supporting the treatment of student-athletes as 
employees. Finally, Subsection IV.B includes commentators who support 
defining student-athletes as employees for various reasons. 
A. Examining the Employer-Employee Relationship 
Whether an individual is covered by a particular employment, labor, 
or tax law hinges on the definition of “employee.”140 Because no set 
standard at the federal or state level affords a legislative definition of the 
term employee, various tests have been occupied to help decipher the 
appropriate characterization of such a worker.141 The depiction of an 
individual as an employee generally requires an analysis under one of the 
various commonly utilized tests, including: (1) the common law test 
(embraced by the IRS), (2) the economic realities test, and (3) the hybrid 
test.142 
1. The Common Law/IRS Twenty-Factor Test 
The common law test was developed under the traditional legal basis 
of agency law, which requires that within an employment context one 
person (the employee) acts for or represents another (the employer) by the 
 
 140.  Susan N. Housman, Who Is an Employee? Determining Independent Contractor Status, 
U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR (Aug. 1999), http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/
herman/reports/futurework/conference/staffing/9.1_contractors.htm. 
 141.  See id. 
 142.  See Charles J. Muhl, What is an Employee? The Answer Depends on the Federal Law, 
MONTHLY LABOR REV. 1, 5-6 (Jan. 2002), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/art1full.pdf; see 
also Karen R. Harned, Georgine M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, Creating A Workable Legal 
Standard for Defining an Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 99-100 
(2010) (noting that state and local governments have used several different tests to address the 
question of employer/employee relationship, to include the common law approaches, the IRS 
approach, and the ABC Test (a third test used by some states in determining whether workers are 
classified as employees or independent contractors for state unemployment tax purposes)); YOUR 
DICTIONARY, ABC test–Legal Definition, http://www.yourdictionary.com/abc-test (last visited Feb. 
24, 2015) (The ABC test asks: (1) does the individual work independently of the employer’s control 
(A = Alone), (2) does the individual maintain his own place of business (B = Business), and (3) Does 
the individual work at an established trade and exercise control over his own schedule and work 
environment (C = Control)).  
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employer’s authority.143 Under the common law test, courts have 
evaluated both contractual intent and the right to control to analyze 
whether an employer-employee relationship exists.144 
In conjunction with the idea of contractual intent, courts have noted 
that there must be a showing of “intent to enter into an employee-
employer relationship at the time the parties entered into the 
agreement.”145 Specifically, there must be an indication of a shared 
understanding that an employer-employee relationship exists.146 In 
evaluating the right to control, an examination of whether the employer 
possesses “the right to control the manner, means, and details of the 
worker’s performance” is required.147 Factors influencing this analysis 
include “contractual provisions, the exercise of control, the method of 
payment, the furnishing of equipment, and the right to terminate the 
employee.”148 Although the common law test involves an evaluation of 
ten individual factors to determine whether a person is an employee, with 
no one single factor being dispositive, the IRS uses a derivative of this 
test, taking into account some of the common law test factors as part of its 
own twenty-factor test.149 
 
 143.  Muhl, supra note 142, at 3 (citing to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 62); Id. at 5. 
 144.  Justin C. Vine, Note: Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes Are Employees of their 
University, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y. & ETHICS J. 235, 246-47 (2013); see also Rensing v. Indiana 
State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983) (involving a collegiate football player 
who suffered a debilitating injury resulting in his claim for recovery under workmen’s compensation; 
the court noted, “It is clear that while a determination of the existence of an employee-employer 
relationship is a complex matter involving many factors, the primary consideration is that there was 
an intent that a contract of employment, either express or implied, did exist.”); see also E.E.O.C. v. 
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F. 3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[t]he most important 
factor in deciding whether a worker was an employee or an independent contractor was the employer’s 
right to control the worker’s work” while also employing an economic realities test).  
 145.  Vine, supra note 144, at 248; see also Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 
N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983). 
 146.  Vine, supra note 144, at 248. 
 147.  Davis, supra note 135, at 286; see also Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 
730, 751-52 (1989). 
 148.  Davis, supra note 135, at 286; see also ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S 
COMPENSATION, § 44.31, at 8-89 (1990). 
 149.  See Muhl, supra note 142, at 5, 7 (offering that the ten factors analyzed under the common 
law test are: right to control, type of business, supervision, skill level, tools and materials, continuing 
relationship, method of payment, integration, intent, and employment by more than one firm); see 
also Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (codified at Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1 (LEXIS through Oct. 
28, 2015 issue of the Fed. Register)); Marilyn Barrett, Independent Contractor/Employee 
Classification in the Entertainment Industry: The Old, the New and the Continuing Uncertainty, 13 
U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 91, 96-98 (1995, 1996) (expanding on the IRS’s twenty-factor test 
when differentiating between employees and independent contractors: 
1. Instructions or Degree of Control. An employer generally exercises a far greater degree 
of supervision and control over the details of the work being done by employees than by 
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The IRS twenty-factor test on employment status (IRS test) is not a 
test per se but an analytical tool employed to arrive at a determination of 
the control test.150 Similar to the common law test, no single factor within 
the IRS test is weighted heavier than another, and there is no minimum 
 
independent contractors. 
2. Furnishing of Training. An employer generally does not provide training to independent 
contractors. 
3. Integration. An independent contractor generally engages in projects that are not a part 
of the day-to-day operations of the company. 
4. Services Rendered Personally; Right to Delegate Work. An employee is generally re-
quired to render the requested services personally. 
5. Right to Hire, Supervise, Pay and Fire Assistants. An independent contractor provides 
the labor necessary to accomplish the purpose of the contract and has the right to hire, 
supervise, pay and fire assistants. In contrast, if the person for whom the services are per-
formed has these rights, an employee relationship is indicated. 
6. Continuing Relationship. An independent contractor is generally hired for a specified 
time period whereas an employee is generally hired for an indefinite period of time. 
7. Control Over Hours of Work. The employer’s right to set the hours worked indicates 
employee status. 
8. Independent Trade; Full Time Work. Where a worker must work full time for the em-
ployer for whom services are provided, such person has greater control over the worker’s 
work. 
9. Place of Work. Working on the employer’s premises indicates employer control and 
employee status. 
10. Sequence of Work. An employer does not direct an independent contractor as to the 
sequence in which the work should be performed, only the outcome of the work to be. 
11. Reports Required. An independent contractor is generally not required to submit regular 
reports or attend regular meetings. 
12. Payment by Hour, Week, or Month. An independent contractor is generally paid by the job 
whereas an employee is generally paid by the hour, week or month. 
13. Payment of Business and/or Travel Expenses. A worker whose business and/or traveling 
expenses is reimbursed by the person for whom services are performed is ordinarily an 
employee. 
14. Furnishing of Tools. An employee is provided tools by the employer. 
15. Investment in Facilities. Lack of an investment in facilities indicates dependence upon the 
person for whom services are provided and employee status. 
16. Profit and Loss. An employee generally does not bear a real economic risk. 
17.  Working for More than One Firm. An independent contractor frequently works for many 
firms simultaneously. 
18.  Making Work Available to the General Public. A worker who makes his services available 
to the general public on a regular and consistent basis is generally an independent contractor. 
19.  Right to Discharge. An employer may terminate an employee at will, absent a written 
employment contract and subject to limitations under applicable labor and tort laws. 
20.  Right to Terminate. If a worker has the right to terminate the relationship at any time 
without incurring liability, an employee relationship is indicated.). 
 150.  Judson D. Stelter, Note, The IRS’ Classification Settlement Program: Is It an Adequate 
Tool to Relieve Taxpayer Burden for Small Businesses that Have Misclassified Workers As 
Independent Contractors?, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 451, 457-58 (2008) (citing Jack E. Karns, Current 
Federal and State Conflicts in the Independent Contractor Versus Employee Classification 
Controversy, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 105, 108 (1999)). 
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number of factors necessary to conclude that an employer-employee 
relationship exists.151 The factors analyzed as part of this test are 
categorized into three groups—behavioral control, financial control, and 
type of relationship—and include training, integration of workers’ 
services into business operations, services rendered personally, 
continuing relationship, set hours of work, working on the employer’s 
premises, right to discharge, and right to terminate.152 Although the IRS 
test is commonly used to help characterize a worker as an employee, it is 
met with some skepticism in academic literature for its inefficiency and 
subjectivity in distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors.153 
Still, the common law/IRS test has been applied to issues associated 
with the NLRA, which governs labor-management relations and 
collective bargaining for unionized employers.154 Further, in Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,155 the U.S. Supreme Court cited 
favorably to the IRS’s test, ruling that for Federal laws not containing a 
clear definition of the term employee, the relationship between an 
employer-employee should be evaluated on the basis of the common law 
test, focusing specifically on who has the right to control the worker.156 
Summarily, under the common law test, an individual whose work process 
and product are found to be controlled by the employer will be deemed an 
employee.157 
From a federal income tax perspective, the IRS specified in Revenue 
 
 151.  See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 CB 296.; see also Alexandre Zucco, Note, Independent 
Contractors and the Internal Revenue Service’s “Twenty Factor” Test: Perspective on the Problems 
of Today and the Solutions for Tomorrow, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 599, 601 (2011). 
 152.  See Harned, et al., supra note 142, at 103; see also Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 CB 296 for a 
full list of all twenty applicable test factors. 
 153.  See Zucco, supra note 151, at 609 (arguing that the IRS’s twenty factors were established 
to represent a multitude of competing considerations that are not easily classifiable, that the three 
categories create only arbitrary groups without specific clarification as to any of the individual factors, 
and that courts have interpreted these twenty factors in various and unexpected ways, further adding 
to the layer of inconsistency); see also Harned et al., supra note 142, at 103 (analyzing certain negative 
issues arising from the IRS twenty-factor test, to include burdensome compliance obligations, the 
subjectivity in interpreting the various factors, and the applicability limitations of this test to federal 
employment taxes and income tax withholding); Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative 
Solution to the Economic Harm of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 113 
(2009) (proposing that the IRS twenty-factor test is insufficient “to deal with the range of evils” 
arising from the misclassification of workers). 
 154.  Muhl, supra note 142, at 5. 
 155.  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992). 
 156.  Id.; see also Susan Schwochau, Note: Identifying an Independent Contractor For Tax 
Purposes: Can Clarity and Fairness Be Achieved?, 84 IOWA L. REV. 163, 181 n. 112 (1998) (noting 
the Darden Court’s favorable application of the IRS’s twenty-factor test). 
 157.  Muhl, supra note 142, at 6. 
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Ruling 87-41 that “an individual is an employee for federal employment 
tax purposes if the individual has the status of an employee under the usual 
common law rules applicable in determining the employer- employee 
relationship.”158 Although some courts have moved away from express 
reliance on the IRS test, it is noteworthy that Revenue Ruling 87-41 is still 
the current law and reflects the IRS’s classification of employment status 
from an income tax perspective.159 
Although the IRS has itself acknowledged that additional factors 
may be important in classifying the employment relationship, its potential 
reliance on the twenty-factor test in the future with regards to student-
athletes cannot be discounted.160 Employing the application of the twenty-
factor test in Darden, the relationship between student-athletes and the 
university they play for must focus specifically on who has the right to 
control.161 The original NLRB ruling relied on the premise that 
Northwestern University scholarship football players were employees and 
were entitled to form a union based on certain factors, which included the 
extent of time dedicated to their sport, the amount of control exerted by 
coaches, and the scholarship agreements which paralleled contracts for 
compensation.162 Analyzing the right of control that universities have over 
student-athletes has been heavily scrutinized in academic literature, 
offering a composite sketch of the magnitude of daily, pervasive control 
imposed by athletic departments and coaches on student-athletes.163 
Analyzing the enormous control that universities have over some student-
 
 158.  Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. 
 159.  Robert Wood, Independent Contractor vs. Employee and Blackwater, 70 MONT. L. REV. 
95, 106 (2009); see also Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc. v. United States, 503 F. 2d 423, 428-29 (2d Cir. 
1994); Leb’s Enter. Inc. v. United States, 2000 WL 139551, 5-6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2000). 
 160.  See Wood, supra note 159, at 106 (citing to IRS Employment Tax Handbook, I.R.S. Pub. 
No. 104, at § 5.81 (2007); Independent Contractor or Employee?, I.R.S. Pub. Training Materials No. 
3320-102, TPDS 842381 (Oct. 30, 2996)).  
 161.  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992). 
 162.  Strauss & Elder, supra note 1.  
 163.  See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 112 at 97-119 (examining the degree of control 
over student-athletes by their universities, including the excessive and mandatory daily practice 
schedules, conditioning, weightlifting sessions, study halls, game day activities, and required travel 
schedules during the pre-, regular, and post seasons); see also Vine, supra note 144, at 251 (2013) 
(presenting that University athletic departments exercise an enormous amount of control over 
scholarship athletes, including attendance at mandatory practices, games, film sessions, and study 
hall); Nicholas Fram and T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to Reshape 
Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFFALO L. REV. 1003, 1032 (2012) (documenting that student-
athletes’ labor and lives are subject to the control of their universities, both on and off the field to an 
extent that most other employees would consider intolerable); Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes 
as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 65, 102 (2014) (documenting that 
college athletes are subject to highly detailed control by their universities over how they perform their 
services). 
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athletes suggests an employee-employer relationship exists under the 
common law/IRS Twenty-Factor Test.164 
One potential outlier that could be considered should the IRS 
reevaluate the tax status of student-athletes’ scholarship money in the 
future is the 1983 case, Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of 
Trustees.165 This case addressed the question of whether an injured 
student-athlete qualified as a university employee for purposes of 
workers’ compensation benefits.166 In vacating the Indiana Court of 
Appeals decision in favor of Rensing as an employee under the Indiana 
statute, the state Supreme Court denied the student-athlete any benefits, 
finding no evidence of an employer-employee relationship.167 
Although this case primarily addressed a workers’ compensation 
issue, the Indiana Supreme Court focused in part on the scholarship offer 
itself, finding that Rensing’s acceptance of the scholarship did not elevate 
to the level of an employment contract as neither party considered the 
scholarship to be either pay or income.168 Particularly, the court stated that 
neither “the University, the NCAA, the IRS [or] Rensing, himself” 
considered the scholarship benefits to be income.169 The court further 
documented that “Rensing did not consider the [scholarship] benefits as 
income as he did not report them for income tax purposes.”170 
The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the IRS does not 
distinguish between athletic and academic scholarships and that 
scholarship recipients are not taxed on their scholarship proceeds.171 In 
essence, if the scholarship proceeds were not considered reportable to the 
IRS, the Court did not consider it income.172 However, as the reasoning 
behind the Rensing analysis was specific to the qualification of workers’ 
compensation benefits, such rationale would not suffice in situations 
where student-athletes are specifically defined as employees by their 
institution.173 The Rensing court focused on the amateur nature of college 
 
 164.  NLRB v. Northwestern, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221; Muhl, supra note 142, at 5. 
 165.  Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983). 
 166.  Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1170-71. 
 167.  IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-1 et seq. (Burns, through the 2015 First Regular Session of the 
119th General Assembly, P.L. 1-2591974); see also Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1171, 1175. 
 168.  Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship Athletes 
Are An Employer’s Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 167, 188 (1996); see also Rensing, 
at 1174. 
 169.  Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1174. 
 170.  Id. at 1173. 
 171.  Id. See also Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-31 I.R.B. 
 172.  Ukeiley, supra note 168, at 188. 
 173.  See Goplerud, supra note 136, at 1099 (opining, similarly, that the Rensing analysis would 
not be available to a court reviewing the issue of whether a stipend paid to student-athletes would 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss4/1
1 - KISSKA-SCHULTZE MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/2016  12:34 PM 
2016] TAXING QUALIFIED SCHOLARSHIPS 801 
sports in conjunction with the NCAA’s prohibition on paying student-
athletes.174 If universities were to officially label select student-athletes as 
employees and subsequently offer scholarships or stipends to cover their 
tuition, fees, room, board, and books in exchange for participating on the 
sports field, such payments would begin to look more like a professional 
sports contractual relationship.175 
As the Rensing Court focused on the amateurism perspective of 
college athletics in concluding that an employment contractual agreement 
did not create a contract-for-hire, it would not likely be heavily relied upon 
in determining whether student-athletes’ scholarship funds are taxable 
should they be officially deemed employees of their institutions in the 
future.176 However, the decision is intriguing for its demonstration of how 
the perception of amateurism in college athletics sways the legal 
determination of the relationship between student-athletes to their 
universities.177 
2. The Economic Realities Test 
An alternative test used to characterize a worker as an employee is 
the economic realities test. This test, which is generally applied in the 
context of the FLSA governing minimum-wage and overtime obligations, 
specifically targets the economic relationship between the worker and the 
employer.178 Specifically, an individual is defined as an employee if they 
are economically dependent on the employer for continued employment, 
regardless of how the employer chooses to label them.179 This test is 
generally satisfied “where a worker performs tasks integral to the 
employer’s regular business, and does not provide an independent 
business or service vis-à-vis the employer.”180 
Under the purview of the economic realities test, the nature of the 
relationship between worker and employer is examined “in light of the 
fact that independent contractors would typically not rely on a sole 
 
constitute a wage paid for services as a stipend provision within scholarships would likely fall within 
the existing definition of “employee”). 
 174.  Id., citing Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1173. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  See Davis, supra note 135, at 290-91. 
 177.  Id. at 293 (documenting the significance of the Rensing, Coleman, Van Horn, and Nemeth 
court decisions within the legal analyses of relationships between athletes and their universities). 
 178.  Muhl, supra note 142, at 6-9. 
 179.  Id.; see also Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The 
Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 
38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 240 (1997). 
 180.  Davis, supra note 135, at 287 (citing LARSON, supra note 150, at § 45.00, at 8-193). 
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employer for continued employment at any one time, but would work for, 
and be compensated by, many different employers, whereas most 
employees hold a single job and rely on that one employer for continued 
employment and for their primary source of income.”181 It is the easiest 
test for a plaintiff to satisfy in construing a person as an employee because 
of its broad application of the term employee.182 Factors used to determine 
a worker’s status under the economic realities test are: (1) whether the 
worker’s services are integral to the employer’s business, (2) the worker’s 
investment in the facilities and equipment, (3) the management’s right to 
control, (4) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, (5) the skill and 
initiative required in performing the job, and (6) the permanency of the 
relationship.183 
Although there are similarities between the economic realities test 
and common law test, the economic realities test ultimately focuses on 
whether the economic reality is that a worker “depends on someone else’s 
business” for continued employment.184 Specifically, the function of this 
test aims to analyze the dependent nature of the worker to determine 
whether the worker can operate without the employer.185 If an individual 
“operates an independent business basis, the worker is classified as an 
independent contractor under the economic realities test.”186 
The economic realities test was utilized by a Michigan state court 
when analyzing the existence of any employer-employee relationship 
between a university and scholarship athlete in Coleman v. Western 
Michigan University.187 However, the test was applied to ascertain 
whether a scholarship athlete was entitled to workers’ compensation 
following a debilitating injury, which barred him from playing football.188 
At no juncture during its review of this case did the Michigan Court of 
Appeals reference the application of the economic realities test (or any 
other test) to the taxability of the injured player’s scholarship money.189 
Specifically, the court applied the economic realities test solely to inquire 
into the existence of an employment contract between the university and 
 
 181.  Muhl, supra note 142, at 7. 
 182.  Nicola Kean, The Unprotected Workforce: Why Title VII Must Apply to Workfare 
Participants, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 159, 189 (2004). 
 183.  Muhl, supra note 142, at 8. 
 184.  Id. at 9; see also Margot Rutman, Symposium: Exotic Dancers’ Employment Law 
Regulations, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 515, 538-39 (1999). 
 185.  Rutman, supra note 184, at 539. 
 186.  Muhl, supra note 142, at 9. 
 187.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Western Michigan Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  See Coleman, 336 N.W.2d 224. 
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the student-athlete.190 
Similarly, in the 1984 case Cheatham v. Workers’ Compensation 
Appeals Board, a California court held that student-athletes are not 
employees of their universities, noting an “absence of any fair inference 
of economic benefit” to the university from its wrestling program.191 In 
this case, a scholarship recipient student-athlete was injured during a 
wrestling scrimmage and subsequently sought to recoup workers’ 
compensation.192 Comparable to the Coleman decision, the Cheatham 
court opined only on the question of whether petitioner was an employee 
within the meaning of the California labor standards, not tax law.193 
Because the IRS utilizes its own twenty-factor test to determine 
whether a worker is an employee under common law principles from a 
federal income tax perspective, and as the economic realities test has been 
relied on in analyzing employment characterization specifically from a 
labor standards viewpoint, the economic realities test would not likely be 
the tool utilized exclusively to analyze the taxability of student-athletes’ 
scholarship money in the future.194 However, student-athlete scholarship 
funds would arguably qualify as taxable income under the economic 
realities test. 
3. The Hybrid Test 
Although a middle ground test that combines elements of both the 
common law and economic realities test, the hybrid test was adopted 
specifically for the purpose of determining employee status under federal 
discrimination statutes. The hybrid test is a combination of elements of 
the common law and economic realities tests.195 The economic realities of 
the working relationship is a crucial factor under the hybrid test, but the 
employer’s right to control the work process is the determinative factor.196 
While the NLRA has generally applied the common law right to 
control test when scrutinizing the employment classification of a worker, 
courts resolving cases involving the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) tend to apply the economic realities test, while the wider judicial 
trend is to apply the hybrid test to cases involving Title VII of the Civil 
 
 190.  Id. at 225; see also Craig D. Alfred, Comment: The Illusion of Amateurism: A Climate of 
Tortious Interference in the World of Amateur Sports, 86 TUL. L. REV. 465, 483 (2011). 
 191.  Cheatham v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 49 Cal. Comp. Cases 54, 61 (1984). 
 192.  Id. at 54. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  See Zucco, supra note 151, at 601. 
 195.  Muhl, supra note 142, at 9. 
 196.  Id. 
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Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA).197 However, many courts have also rejected the adoption of the 
hybrid test in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Darden, 
indicating that the common law standard was the appropriate test to use 
where a statute fails to specifically define the term employee.198 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Darden focused only on 
defining an “employee” under ERISA, allowing federal and state courts 
to continue to apply the hybrid test in other areas of the law.199 The 
combined common law/economic realities test components considered in 
applying the hybrid test include supervision, skill level, method of 
payment, supplier of tools and materials, duration of employment 
relationship, and integration of work into the employer’s business.200 
Other factors further examined under this test include the manner in which 
the work relationship is terminated, whether annual leave and/or 
retirement benefits are provided, and whether the employer paid Social 
Security taxes for the worker.201 
Although a middle ground test that combines elements of both the 
common law and economic realities test, the hybrid test was adopted 
specifically for the purpose of determining employee status under federal 
discrimination statutes.202 Although federal and state courts have applied 
the hybrid test, the application of this test in evaluating the employment 
status of a student-athlete from a federal income tax perspective is not 
likely given both the Darden holding as well as the overriding reality that 
the IRS could choose to apply its own twenty-factor test.203 
Following an analysis of the various tests that may be reviewed in 
determining whether workers are defined as employees from a federal tax 
perspective, the next query is specifically analyzing how paid student-
athletes would be characterized for federal income tax purposes. As the 
proper characterization of paid student-athletes is imperative to 
 
 197.  Cliff E. Spencer, Comment, Oregon’s Independent Contractor Statute: A Legislative 
Placebo for Employers, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 673 (1995). 
 198.  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318; see also Mitchell H. Rubinstein, 
Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and Employers Who 
Operate in the Borderland Between an Employer-And-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
605, 627 (2012) (referencing Deal v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 5 F.3d 117, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1993), 
Magallanes v. Penske Logistics LLC, 570 F. Supp. 2d 907, 912 (W.D. Tex. 2008), Hopkins v. 
Cornerstone Am, 545 F.3d 338, 347 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
 199.  Rubinstein, supra note 198, at 627. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Muhl, supra note 142, at 10; see also Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 
270, 272-73 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 202.  Harned, et.al., supra note 142, at 101. 
 203.  Id.; see also Darden, 503 U.S. 318. 
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understanding the overall federal tax implications, which certain college 
athletes could face in the future, the following analysis ensues. 
B. Characterizing Student-Athletes as Employees for Federal Income 
Tax Purposes 
The proper characterization of a worker as an employee or 
independent contractor within a working, business relationship is vitally 
important to both the employers and workers in terms of their mutual 
obligations and protection under federal law.204 When employment status 
is blurred, employment rights and obligations are likewise uncertain.205 
Uncertainty breeds litigation.206 Although such classification depends on 
the application of federal law, the overriding factor in every test analyzed 
previously is who has the right to control the work process, not the label 
affixed by the employer.207 
Recent literature querying whether student-athletes should be 
characterized as employees under the right to control test suggests there 
is a sufficient basis to demonstrate that an employer- employee 
relationship already exists.208 Specifically, scholars have critically 
explored the question of whether student-athletes are exploited by the 
universities they play for and have challenged that student-athletes are in 
fact employees given that academics has taken a back seat to the true 
purpose of university agendas—to increase revenue and furnish to their 
programs greater exposure.209 
 
 204.  Muhl, supra note 142, at 10. 
 205.  See Rubinstein, supra note 198, at 609. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  See Muhl, supra note 142, at 10. 
 208.  See Vine, supra note 144, at 266 (providing a comprehensive discussion and analysis of 
major NCAA-related decisions involving the issue of whether student-athletes should be 
characterized as student-athletes, analyzing the tests used by the IRS and courts to determine the 
nature of an employment relationship, and concluding that, “NCAA scholarship athletes are 
employees of their respective university. They are employees under common law. They are 
employees under federal law. Now, more than ever, it is time to put an end to the idea that recipients 
of an athletic scholarship are not employees of the university. Equity demands Courts to deem 
scholarship athletes employees.”); see also Jason Gurdus, Protection Off of the Playing Field: Student 
Athletes Should be Considered University Employees for Purposes of Workers’ Compensation, 29 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 909-12 (2001) (applying the various control tests to conclude that student-
athletes are arguably employees of the institutions they play for); McCormick & McCormick, supra 
note 112, at 82, 130-55 (asserting that the relationship between a university and student-athletes 
primarily commercial, not academic, in nature and that an objective judiciary must recognize the 
employee status of student-athletes). 
 209.  Vine supra note 144, at 266 (“allowing their academics to play second fiddle”); see also 
Gurdus, supra note 208, at 929 (stating that student-athletes are employees of their university and 
“[t]he amount of proof available to show that an employment relationship exists between student 
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In evaluating the characterization of student-athletes as unpaid 
amateurs versus professional employees, the argument can be made that 
college sports have not been strictly amateur for countless years, if ever.210 
Specifically, a literary analysis of the extent of control exerted by coaches 
over Division I-A football players both on and off the field, during the 
athletic season and extending into the remainder of the academic year, 
concluded that the common law right to control test is already being 
met.211 
Drawing on data derived from personal interviews with Division I-
A football players, research establishes that coaches exert an inordinate 
amount of control over college football players not only during the regular 
season, but extending into the off-season as well.212 Collegiate coaches 
control student-athletes’ playing time, competitive eligibility, and access 
to training resources.213 Arguably, student-athletes are subject to greater 
control by their universities than are any other employees or group of 
employees already being financially compensated for working at such 
institutions.214 
The concept that student-athletes should remain unpaid amateurs has 
been further criticized as universities’ outward control over their student-
athletes has increased in the media.215 Particularly, an examination of the 
degree of control that universities have over student-athletes’ names, 
images, and likenesses has in recent years transformed from literary 
 
athletes and colleges is substantial”). 
 210.  See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 112, at 75. 
 211.  Id. at 98. Today, the NCAA refers to Division I-A football as the Football Bowl 
Subdivision (FBS) whereas Division I-AA is the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS). 
 212.  Id. at 98-105 (noting that coaches’ exercise of control of Division I-A athletes is apparent 
in the form of location, duration, and manner in which athletes participate in required practices, 
games, and academic commitments during the regular season, as well as the control which coaches 
have over players’ lives in the off-season to include training, conditioning, team meetings, mandatory 
study halls, summertime weightlifting and running, and mandatory pre-season practices beginning in 
early August which encompasses the most intensive training period of the year. Other demands on 
student-athletes include attendance at post-season bowl games, recruitment pressures and mandatory 
random drug testing.). 
 213.  Susan L. Smith & Miriam Schuchman, Sickle Cell Screening of College Athletes: Legal 
Obligations Fulfilled, Moral Obligations Lacking, 92 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1141 (2014). 
 214.  McCormick & McCormick, supra note 112, at 97. 
 215.  See W. Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using a 
Nonprofit Organization to Support Student-Athletes, 35 IND. L. REV. 851, 923 (2001) (stating, “It is 
possible to argue that, in the name of keeping intercollegiate athletics an integral part of education, 
institutions should be permitted to exercise broader controls over student-athletes than over non-
athletes. Evidence suggests that without some controls intercollegiate athletics can get out of hand.”). 
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discussion216 to judicial litigation involving the NCAA.217 As previously 
discussed, legal attacks against the NCAA have recently pivoted on 
whether student-athletes’ likenesses are unlawfully being used in 
commercial video games and, therefore, whether certain student-athletes 
should be compensated.218 Such scrutiny surrounding the classification of 
the relationships among student-athletes, the institutions they play for, and 
the NCAA is indicative of the continued momentum to characterize 
student-athletes as employees under the law.219 
During his trial against the NCAA, Ed O’Bannon specifically 
testified that his role at UCLA was to play basketball and that making it 
to class was difficult due to the amount of time he spent training.220 
O’Bannon stated, “I was an athlete masquerading as a student . . . . I was 
there strictly to play basketball.”221 Others who testified at the O’Bannon 
trial stated that they viewed playing sports in college as their occupation, 
noting that it is difficult, or even impossible, for student-athletes to 
function like normal students due to the amount of time they are required 
to devote to their sport.222 
Student-athletes, in return for universities’ promises of free higher 
education, the opportunity to earn a seat in the spotlight, and the potential 
 
 216.  See, e.g., Kristal S. Stippich & Kadence A. Otto, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far? An 
Analysis of the Enforceability of Student-Athlete Consent to Use of Name & Likeness, 20 J. LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF SPORT 151, 180 (2010) (discussing the Ed O’Bannon lawsuit in light of name, image and 
likeness litigation and offering that “the definition of “amateur” will ultimately need to be resolved.”); 
see also Spencer H. Larche, Pink-Shirting: Should the NCAA Consider a Maternity and Paternity 
Waiver?, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 393, 401-02 (2008) (presenting both sides of the argument over 
whether student-athletes should be employees and noting that courts generally have not regarded 
student-athletes as employees and offering that educational institutions do not have “significant right 
of control” over their activities and cannot fire them, per se. Larche also offers that some individuals 
believe otherwise and that athletics departments do, in fact, exercise a significant degree of control 
over their time on campus including, “what classes to take, when to study, and when and what to eat, 
in addition to the traditionally known demands placed upon student-athletes by practice schedules 
and games.”).  
 217.  See Lee Romney, Judge Rules against NCAA in Ed O’Bannon Antitrust Lawsuit, LA TIMES 
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ncaa-obannon-ruling-20140808-
story.html (discussing the decision by U.S. District Court Judge Claudia Wilken, which held that the 
NCAA’s policies that prohibit student-athletes from profiting from their own names, images, and 
likenesses “unreasonably restrain trade”). 
 218.  See Wolohan, supra note 32. 
 219.  Id.; see also Chris Dufresne, Ed O’Bannon Ruling is not the Real Game-changer for the 
NCAA, LA TIMES (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-ncaa-game-
changer-2014081-story.html (quoting Southeastern Conference Commissioner Mike Slive who states 
that colleges are “going through a historic evolution” in light of the O’Bannon decision). 
 220.  Isaac Brekken, Judge Rules Against NCAA in Ed O’Bannon Case, CBS NEWS (Aug. 8, 
2014, 8:19 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-rules-against-ncaa-in-ed-obannon-case/. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. 
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for future opportunities in the professional world of sports, “give their 
blood, sweat, tears, and their lives for the success of their team and the 
school’s reputation.”223 College athletics is more than mere friendly 
competition among schools—but a huge revenue and reputation-
garnering business venture.224 
Although the NCAA continues to defend its preservation of 
amateurism in college sports amidst past arguments that student-athletes 
are employees of their institutions and are controlled by the coaching staff, 
the IRS has thus far refused to characterize student-athletes as employees 
from an income tax perspective.225 However, in conjunction with growing 
arguments that universities overtly control student-athletes, specifically 
identifying student-athletes as employees of the institutions they play for 
may require the IRS to eventually reevaluate its stance on taxing student-
athletes’ scholarship income. 
On April 19, 2014, the IRS drafted a public letter to the Honorable 
Richard Burr, North Carolina U.S. Senator, confirming the current federal 
tax treatment of college athletic scholarships.226 Within this letter, the IRS 
noted that “whether an individual is treated as an employee for labor law 
purposes is not controlling of whether the individual is an employee for 
federal tax purposes.”227 The letter further documented: “It has long been 
the position of the IRS that athletic scholarships can qualify for exclusion 
from income under section 117.”228  Revenue Ruling 77-264, 1977 1 C.B. 
47, addresses the tax treatment of athletic scholarships where the student-
athlete is expected to participate in the sport and where the scholarship is 
not cancelled in the event the student is not required to engage in any other 
activities in lieu of participating in the sport.229 The ruling holds that the 
athletic scholarship awarded by the university is primarily to aid the 
 
 223.  Roya R. Helmat, Malpractice During Practice: Should NCAA Coaches Be Liable For 
Negligence?, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 613, 635 (2002). 
 224.  See Gurdus, supra note 208, at 929 (2001). 
 225.  See Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far 
Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2342 (2014) (discussing the NCAA’s current stance 
on amateurism); see also NCAA Manual 2.9 (stating that “student-athletes shall be amateurs in an 
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the 
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is 
an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and 
commercial enterprises.”). 
 226.  See Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, CONEX 113035-14, No. 2014-
0016, (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/14-0016.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2015). 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Rev. Rul. 77-264, 1977 1 C.B. 47. 
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recipients in pursuing their studies and, therefore, is excludable under 
Section 117.230 
Regardless of this public assurance, future contractual agreements 
between student-athletes and their universities that involve “additional 
cash and a share of royalties could cause the IRS to conclude that an 
athletic scholarship is part of a larger compensation package,” thereby 
making the entire package taxable.231 If certain student-athletes are 
represented by a union, the result may ensue that qualified scholarships 
become part of the overall negotiated term of the contractual 
agreement.232 Once a labor union is involved with negotiating the 
qualified scholarships for student-athletes, it is more likely that the 
scholarship money will become taxable income. 
The O’Bannon decision referred to student-athletes’ share of revenue 
from the use of their names and likenesses as compensation.233 The federal 
reporting of such compensation would undoubtedly be considered taxable 
income.234 Similarly, student-athletes’ share of licensing revenue would 
arguably be treated as taxable income by the IRS regardless of the fact 
that such funds may be deposited into trusts.235 Therefore, the current 
NCAA notion that scholarship athletes are truly students first and athletes 
second—rather than paid employees of their institutions—could be 
heavily scrutinized in the future.236 
The landmark case in this area which signifies that athletic 
scholarships could be taxable if student-athletes are treated as employees 
falls to Bingler.237 As discussed previously, the U.S. Supreme Court 
impressed the significance of the quid pro quo test, preserving the notion 
that students who provide services in exchange for scholarships or grants 
may not exclude their awards from gross income.238 Therefore, amounts 
 
 230.  See Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, CONEX 113035-14, No. 2014-
0016, supra note 226. 
 231.  See Game On! Recent Legal Developments and Tax Issues for Collegiate Athletics, ROPES 
& GRAY (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.ropesgray.com/news-and-insights/Insights/2014/
September/Game-On-Recent-Legal-Developments-and-Tax-Issues-for-Collegiate-Athletics.aspx. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Jackie Perlman & Alison Flores, Students, Athletes—and Taxpayers? A Recent Court 
Decision may have Major Repercussions for Colleges’ Star Players, ACCOUNTING TODAY (Dec. 2, 
2014), http://www.accountingtoday.com/taxprotoday/news/students-athletes-226128-and-
taxpayers72898-1.html. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. (further noting that although student-athletes may not have immediate access to trust 
funds while they are in attendance at school, the athletes would likely be taxed when the compensation 
is paid to the trust). 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969). 
 238.  See id. at 751 (The Court noted, “Here, the definitions supplied by the Regulation clearly 
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received in return for services rendered are treated as compensation rather 
than scholarship funds.239 
The Bingler decision exposes student-athletes to the possibility that 
scholarship funds may inevitably be taxable given the totality of 
contractual opportunities that could become part of student-athletes’ 
negotiable package deals in the future.240 Distinguishing scholarship 
funds from stipends or compensation, which schools may begin to offer 
select student-athletes, along with potential licensing revenues, could 
create blurred lines when applying the Bingler quid pro quo test.241 
Ultimately, the decision of how to treat student-athletes’ scholarship funds 
would likely come down to an IRS pronouncement or federal judicial 
determination. For student-athletes, the tax code leaves no room for 
interpretation—any form of compensation received in exchange for 
playing sports will invalidate the tax-exempt nature of their scholarship 
funds.242 
V. CONCLUSION 
The NLRB’s 2014 ruling that Northwestern University’s scholarship 
football players were employees of the institution under the NLRA and 
could unionize and bargain collectively, though subsequently 
unanimously overturned, temporarily threatened the NCAA’s deep-
seeded principle of amateurism in college sports.243 Under the strong 
tradition of amateurism, student-athletes may only receive athletic 
scholarships to help pay for their higher education, while simultaneously 
engaging in competitive athletics for their respective universities.244 
Amateurism requires that student-athletes who are, or have been, paid to 
 
are prima facie proper, comporting as they do with the ordinary understanding of ‘scholarships’ and 
‘fellowships’ as relatively disinterested, ‘no strings’ educational grants, with no requirements of any 
substantial quid pro quo from the recipients.”); see also Hoeflich, supra note 80, at 591 (noting the 
significance of the Bingler court upholding the quid pro quo test). 
 239.  See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(d)(2), 53 Fed. Reg. 21688 (Jun. 9, 1988); see also Larkins, 
supra note 96, at 70. 
 240.  See Ken Berry, College Athletes Could Be Sacked with High Taxes on Scholarships, CPA 
PRACTICE ADVISOR (Apr. 13, 2014), http://www.cpapracticeadvisor.com/news/11393197/college-
athletes-could-be-sacked-with-high- taxes-on-scholarships. 
 241.  Id. (citing Dee DeScherer, a NJ-based tax publisher, who notes that while the Bingler 
decision exposes student- athletes to the threat of tax liability, such exposure to federal taxation is not 
a certainty).  
 242.  See AndersenTax, Student-Athlete/Athlete-Employee: Tax Consequences, for Sure, FOR 
THE RECORD (Sept. 2014), http://www.andersentax.com/publications/newsletter/september-
2014/student-athlete-athlete-employee-tax- consequences-for-sure. 
 243.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 244.  Id. 
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play are ineligible to compete in collegiate varsity athletic sports.245 
A secondary impact entails the potential tax consequences facing 
student-athletes should they be deemed employees of their institutions 
someday.246 To date, student-athletes receiving qualified scholarships 
have not been taxed on scholarship money received.247 However, if 
student-athletes are eventually characterized as employees of the 
institutions they play for, it is viable that the IRS may reconsider whether 
certain student-athletes are receiving part or all of their scholarship money 
in exchange for services rendered. 
The language of the IRC entails that a student may not exclude 
amounts received from gross income if their institution requires services 
in exchange for a grant or stipend.248 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Bingler noted the importance of applying the quid pro quo test, finding 
that students who provide services in exchange for scholarships may not 
exclude their awards from gross income.249 Should the IRS eventually 
reevaluate its stance on the taxability of student-athletes’ scholarship 
funds, it would likely utilize its own twenty-factor common law test to 
determine the proper characterization of student-athletes from a federal 
income tax perspective.250 
The ultimate query hinges on whether the IRS will proactively elect 
to reexamine the taxability of student-athletes’ scholarship money in the 
future. Given that the IRS recently published a letter confirming the 
federal tax treatment of athletic scholarships as it has been employed 
historically, it could be argued that student-athletes’ scholarship money is 
safe from the threat of federal taxation.251 However, given the fact that 
future contracts between student-athletes and their institutions may 
involve additional cash or royalties and that student-athletes may now 
earn a share of revenue from the use of their names and likenesses, the 
IRS may be hard pressed to evaluate whether athletic scholarships are part 
of a greater overall compensation package which is subject to taxation.252 
Alternatively, it could be argued that at least a portion of the money paid 
to certain student-athletes should be included in gross income. 
Finally, the ultimate determination of the taxability of athletic 
scholarships will likely hinge on the application of the Bingler quid pro 
 
 245.  See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
 246.  See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
 247.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 248.  IRC § 117(c) (LEXIS 2015). 
 249.  See Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 751 (1969). 
 250.  See supra notes 145-155 and accompanying text. 
 251.  See supra notes 228-232 and accompanying text. 
 252.  See supra notes 233-238 and accompanying text. 
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quo test.253 This U.S. Supreme Court decision exposes student-athletes to 
the possibility that grants-in-aid may eventually be taxable based on the 
overall contractual opportunities that may become part of their negotiable 
package deals.254 For scholarship or grant recipients, to include student-
athletes, any form of compensation received in exchange for services 
rendered will invalidate the tax-exempt nature of scholarship funds.255 
From a federal tax perspective the historical significance of the 
NLRB’s 2014 Northwestern case as an archetype for student-athletes 
seeking mobilized unionization, combined with decision in the O’Bannon 
case, might one day redefine the notion that student-athletes are not mere 
amateurs receiving qualified scholarships but instead are employees of 
their institutions earning funds in exchange for services rendered on the 
playing field.256 Intrinsically, the IRS may have to reevaluate whether 
qualified scholarships received by student-athletes are excludable from 
gross income in the future. Defining student-athletes as employees of their 
universities may likely cultivate a new era in taxing qualified 
scholarships. 
 
 
 253.  See supra notes 88-98 and 239-243 and accompanying text. 
 254.  See supra notes 233-243 and accompanying text. 
 255.  See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
 256.  See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
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